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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 – Statement of the issue 
 
An important aspect of the debate surrounding globalisation is the question of 
how best to ensure the process is socially sustainable. This includes, amongst 
other considerations, a need to assess how labour standards are upheld, or 
improved, as opposed to put at risk by globalisation. Creating a formal link 
between trade and labour issues has resulted in a protracted debate at both a 
multilateral, State level, and amongst academics. Some advocates claim that such 
provisions have both economical and altruistic benefits, whilst others believe 
such clauses to be merely disguised protectionism. As a result of a reluctance by 
international trade regimes, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
and the subsequent World Trade Organisation, to include labour rights 
compliance within their jurisdiction, and the lack of formal sanctioning powers 
on behalf of the International Labour Organisation, many advocates for 
improved labour protection within international trade have turned to the 
inclusion of “social clauses” within trade agreements to address concerns. 
 
In relation to the trade agreements that include “social clauses” there are two 
general forms; Free Trade Agreements and Generalised Systems/Schemes of 
Preferences. Within both of these areas there is a wide variety as to the content 
of the “social clauses”, and also the mechanisms established in order to ensure 
compliance. Certain regimes include “conditional” social clauses that require 
obligations to be complied for continuation of benefits under the agreement or 
preference system. On the other hand, some agreements and systems include 
“promotional” obligations which reward compliance with incentives or greater 
benefits. Additionally, the content of such clauses is not universal. The scope of 
“labour rights” within these “social clauses” varies depending on the framework 
in question. As shall be seen, a number of agreements include complex inter-
Governmental and independent procedures to ensure that parties to these 
agreements comply with obligations imposed by “social clauses”. However, these 
procedures, in certain frameworks, are limited to specific forms of non-
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compliance in relation to a limited number of “labour rights”. These differences 
in content, and available implementation procedures, can create a hierarchy 
amongst seemingly universal “labour rights”. 
 
The regulatory framework surrounding, and the content contained within, 
“social clauses” is one important factor in considering the extent to which they 
protect labour rights. Additionally, the degree to which these “social clauses” 
have been implemented in practice is of relevance. Within the regimes and 
agreements that include “social clauses” there is a wide range of levels of 
implementation. Despite the inclusion of such clauses having promoted much 
debate, the mechanisms for ensuring compliance are utilised in a relatively small 
number of cases. The agreements containing “social clauses” include high 
aspirations relating to the need to uphold labour standards, however, poor 
implementation of these obligations through a failure to utilise the proceedings 
for ensuring compliance could undermine such positive intentions. 
 
1.2. – Importance of this study 
 
Studies into the inclusion of “social clauses” within trade agreements have been 
previously carried out.1 Additionally, a number of academic articles have 
discussed the link between trade and labour from a number of different 
approaches. However, this thesis shall fully examine the content and regulatory 
framework surrounding “social clauses” contained within all Free Trade 
Agreements and Generalised Systems/Schemes of Preferences. Additionally, this 
thesis shall also thoroughly discuss any proceedings relating to implementation 
of these clauses carried out under a number of different preference systems and 
trade agreements. As a result, this thesis will seek to examine the content and 
regulatory framework surrounding “social clauses” in the international trade 
regime, and also to what extent these have been implemented through 
proceedings provided for in the governing agreement. 
 
 
                                                        
1 For example, ILO, “Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements”, (2013). 
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1.3. – Limitations 
 
The linkage between trade and labour rights is subject to a multi-faceted, 
complex debate. The arguments advanced in favour, and against, such a linkage 
shall be set out in Chapter 2. Much of the debate surrounding the link between 
trade and labour includes economic and trade orientated concerns. However, the 
focus of this thesis is the way in which labour rights are protected from the 
repercussions of liberalised, global trade through “social clauses”. The extent to 
which these labour rights are protected by “social clauses” shall be carried out by 
an examination of the content, and implementation, of these clauses. 
Accordingly, an in depth examination of economic and trade focussed 
considerations shall not be undertaken within this thesis, but such issues are an 
important aspect of the wider debate surrounding the link between trade, labour 
rights, and globalisation. 
 
When considering “implementation” of the identified “social clauses” a focus 
shall be placed upon the instances in which proceedings under the agreement 
have been employed. The discussion shall not consider whether the conclusion 
of these proceedings have resulted in practical changes to compliance with 
labour rights by a party. Establishing the link between any improvement and the 
specific procedures is too difficult a task due to the number of relevant factors 
that can lead to improvement; including economic and developmental 
considerations, and other forms of international pressure.  
 
Further limitations shall be set out where necessary throughout this thesis. 
 
1.4. – Terminology 
 
“Free Trade Agreements” are agreements signed by two or more countries that 
intend to increase the trade of goods and services amongst the countries by 
removing existing barriers to trade. 
 
“Generalised Systems/Schemes of Preferences” are frameworks that provide 
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beneficiary countries with reduced tariffs when importing goods into the 
preference giving country. Further information on such systems can be found in 
Chapter 5.1. 
 
 “Social clauses” shall comprise “(i) any labour standards which establishes 
minimum working conditions, terms of employment or worker rights, (ii) any 
norm on the protection provided to workers under national labour law and its 
enforcement, as well as (iii) any framework for cooperation in and/or 
monitoring of these issues”.2 
 
1.5. – Structure and Methodology 
 
Chapter 2 shall set out the historical background to the link between “trade” and 
“labour standards” and various inter-State discussions on the issue. The wider 
arguments advanced in favour, and against, this link from States and academics 
shall also be discussed.  
 
Chapter 3 and 5 will set out instances of social clauses within Free Trade 
Agreements and Generalised Systems/Schemes of Preferences respectively. An 
overview of the Free Trade Agreements and regional agreements that include 
social clauses is contained within Annexes 1 and 2. These Chapters shall also 
include a detailed overview of the procedures to enforce and implement the 
contained “social clauses”. A comparative approach to the content and regulatory 
frameworks shall be taken and conclusions within the relevant Chapters, and 
Chapter 7, shall include such analysis. 
 
Instances in which these procedures to implement “social clauses”, in relation to 
both Free Trade Agreements and Generalised Systems/Schemes of Preferences, 
shall be discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. This discussion shall take a formalistic 
approach to assessing implementation by examining the proceedings used to 
enforce “social clauses”, as opposed to assessing whether practical 
                                                        
2 ILO, “World of Work Report 2009: The Global Jobs Crisis and Beyond”, (2009), page 64. 
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improvements have resulted.3 In certain circumstances there is a lack of 
information relating to certain proceedings. However, these Chapters shall 
contain detailed, information on proceedings instigated in relation to a number 
of differing regimes. Again, the comparative differences in implementation 
drawn from this discussion shall be set out in conclusion within the body of the 
Chapters, and Chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 7 shall encompass concluding remarks in order to assess general trends 
in the protections contained within “social clauses”, and their implementation, as 
highlighted by the comparative approach used throughout this thesis. 
  
                                                        
3 As discussed above, see Chapter 1.3. 
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Chapter 2 – Link between “trade” and “labour rights” 
 
Prior to any discussion of the particular forms of the links between trade and 
labour within “social clauses”, it is necessary to understand the historical context 
surrounding the issue. Additionally, the arguments advanced in favour and 
against the linkage shall be presented in order to provide a full background for 
further analysis and discussion. As mentioned above, the focus of this thesis is 
examining the ways in which labour rights are protected through emerging 
“social clauses” in international trade regimes. Accordingly, economic and trade 
focussed considerations fall outwith the scope of this thesis.  Despite such 
arguments forming an important part of this complex debate, an in depth 
examination of the merits of the arguments advanced shall not be undertaken.4 
 
2.1. – Historical Context 
 
Historically, the development of labour standards at a domestic level have long 
had international consequences. In 19th Century Europe, a number of States 
enacted domestic legislation in order to combat the laissez-faire approach 
adopted by a number of employers towards working conditions. This change in 
approach was intended to prevent unfair domestic competition and, 
consequently, uphold industrial and political peace. But it had unintended 
consequences at an international level. Concern grew with regards to the 
unequal playing field that was developing amongst States due to the 
inconsistencies in domestic labour laws. This eventually resulted in the 
establishment of the International Association for the Protection of Workers in 
Basle, Switzerland in 1901 in order to level the playing field.5  However, the work 
of the organisation was frustrated by the outbreak of the First World War in 
1914.6 Following the conclusion of the First World War in 1919, a permanent 
                                                        
4 For further information on the economic or trade focussed impacts of labour standards, see 
Siroën, J., “Labour provisions in preferential trade agreements: Current practice and outlook”, 
(2013), International Labour Review, Volume 152:1, pages 85-106 and Banks, K., “The impact of 
globalisation on labour standards: A second look at the evidence”, (2006), in Craig, J. D. R., and 
Lynk, S. M., (eds.), “Globalization and the Future of Labour Law”, (2006). 
5 Servais, J.M., “International Labour Law”, (2005), page 22-23. 
6 Collier, D. and Bamu, P. H., “Linking trade to labour standards: A promising synergy or a double-
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body for the regulation of labour issues, the International Labour Organisation 
(hereinafter “ILO”), was developed as a result of the feeling that social justice 
was a prerequisite for lasting peace.7 In the Preamble to Part XIII of the Peace 
Treaty of Versailles that established the ILO, there is reference made to the 
impact that poor working conditions in one State can have on the development 
of labour standards in another State.8 As a result of increased international trade 
between States, the importance of differing domestic labour standards increased. 
This resulted in a formal discussion about the link between labour standards and 
international trade during the negotiations surrounding the establishment of the 
International Trade Organisation (hereinafter “ITO”). 
 
2.1.1. – International Trade Organisation 
 
The Havana Charter9, concluded in 1948, aimed to establish the ITO. Within the 
Charter, Article 7 recognised that a link between labour standards and trade 
existed and that fair labour standards lead to greater productivity. Additionally, 
the Charter required the removal of any unfair labour conditions that constituted 
barriers to trade.10 The Charter recognised the importance of the work of the ILO 
in relation to labour issues and accordingly affirmed the need for cooperation 
with the ILO on such issues.11 The Charter established a dispute settlement 
system that set out cooperative consultations and arbitration as the first step.12 
Following this, the Executive Board of the organisation could investigate the 
issue,13 with the assistance of the ILO.14 Finally, if the matter had not been 
resolved, the Conference of the Organisation could permit the removal of trade 
                                                                                                                                                              
edged sword?”, (2012), Acta Juridica, at 328. The founding members of the organisation 
(Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland) were heavily 
involved in the First World War. 
7 ILO, “Origins and History”, available at http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--
en/index.htm, (last accessed 12 March 2015). 
8 Preamble to Part XIII, Peace Treaty of Versailles, 1919 - “the failure of a nation to adopt humane 
conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the 
conditions in their own countries”. 
9 United Nations, Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, (24 March 1948), U.N. 
Doc.E/Conf.2/78, (hereinafter “Havana Charter, (1948)”). 
10 Article 7(1), Havana Charter, (1948). 
11 Article 7(2), Havana Charter, (1948). 
12 Article 93, Havana Charter, (1948). 
13 Article 94, Havana Charter, (1948). 
14 Article 94(4), Havana Charter, (1948). 
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concessions.15 Following on from the failure of the ITO, principally due to non-
ratification by the United States Senate, the General Agreement on Tariff and 
Trade (hereinafter “GATT”) was instead agreed upon in 1947. This refusal to 
ratify by the U.S. was not as a result of the social clause,16 but stemmed from 
opposition by business lobbies that rejected the diversity of international 
markets, and the differing roles that business and Governments would have in 
different regimes. The U.S. opposition felt that the Charter did not go far enough 
in breaking down trade barriers cultivated by overly protectionist systems in 
countries with different models.17 
 
2.1.2. – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
 
In general, the GATT removed references to trade and labour that existed within 
the Havana Charter resulting, in this regard, in a much more diluted agreement.  
This was despite the fact that such clauses were not the main failing of the 
Charter. The only formal reference to labour issues within the GATT is contained 
in Article XX, which allows restrictive measures in respect of products of prison 
labour.  In 1953, the U.S. suggested the revival of the regulation of labour 
standards as part of the GATT framework. At this point in time Japan had 
requested to accede to the GATT and so the Ad Hoc Committee on Agenda and 
Intersessional Business established a Working Party on Accession of Japan.18 The 
Working Party consisted of delegations from Australia, Canada, Cuba, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.19 
Alongside the need to provide recommendations on the Japanese accession, the 
Working Party was also mandated to examine provisions of the GATT relating to 
situations where the commercial interests of a Party had been injured in order to 
                                                        
15 Article 95, Havana Charter, (1948). 
16 Malmberg, J. and Johnsson, D., “Social Clauses and Other Means toPromote Fair Labour 
Standards in International Fora – A Survey”, (1998), Arbetslivsrapport, Vol. 25, page 15. 
17 Ostry, S., “Looking Back to Look Forward: The Multilateral Trading System after 50 Years”, 
(2000), page 101, in Secretariat of the World Trade Organisation, “From GATT to the WTO: The 
Multilateral Trading System in the New Millennium”, (2000). 
18 Working Party on Accession of Japan, Ad Hoc Committee on Agenda and Intersessional 
Business, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, “Membership and Terms of Reference”, (4 
February 1953), IC/W/9, (hereinafter, “GATT Working Party, “Membership and Terms of 
Reference”, (1953)”). 
19 GATT Working Party, “Membership and Terms of Reference”, (1953). 
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assess whether they provided adequate protection and redress. To this end the 
U.S. submitted a proposal that would result in the maintenance of “unfair labour 
standards” by a Party being actionable under Article XXIII, GATT.20 Article XXIII 
allowed Parties to request consultations with the offending Party if their actions 
resulted in the impairment of benefits afforded under the GATT.21 Following this, 
the Contracting Parties as a whole could decide to withhold trade preferences 
from the offending Party.22 However, this suggestion was rejected by the 
Working Party and not included in their final report.23 The proposal did not 
receive wide support or opposition within the Working Party but concerns were 
raised as to how useful it would be in practice and also how the term “unfair 
labour practices” would be defined.24 Despite the decision not to formally accept 
this position, the U.S. maintained that issues relating to labour rights practices 
were actionable under Article XXIII,25 although this provision has still never been 
utilised to such an end.26  During the eighth round of multilateral trade 
negotiations held as part of the GATT framework, one of the topics covered was 
the creation of a World Trade Organisation (hereinafter “WTO”). The debate 
surrounding the link between trade and labour issues, and the most appropriate 
form of regulation if any, was reignited. 
 
2.1.3. – World Trade Organisation 
 
During the GATT’s eighth round of negotiations, lasting from 1986 to 1994, the 
U.S. again attempted to formalise the link between trade and labour within the 
                                                        
20 Working Party on Accession of Japan, Ad Hoc Committee on Agenda and Intersessional 
Business, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, “Draft Fair Labour Standards Clause: proposed 
by the United States Delegation”, (6 February 1953), Sec/2/53. 
21 Article XXIII(1), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (1994). 
22 Article XXIII(2), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (1994). 
23 Working Party on Accession of Japan, Ad Hoc Committee on Agenda and Intersessional 
Business, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, “Report on the Accession of Japan”, (13 
February 1953), L/76, § 12. 
24 Ad Hoc Committee on Agenda and Intersessional Business, General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, “Summary Record of the Meeting held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 13 February 
1953”, (18 February 1953), IC/SR.9, page 5. 
25 U.S. Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, “Staff Papers”, (February 1954), page 438. 
26 Charnovitz, S., “The influence of international labour standards on the world trading regime: A 
historical overview”, (1987), International Law Review, Vol. 126:5, page 575 and World Trade 
Organisation, “Analytical Index: Interpretation and Application of Article XXIII”, available at 
https://www.wto.org/ENGLISH/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_08_e.htm, (last 
accessed 20 May 2015). 
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framework of the WTO. The Preparatory Committee, established to prepare for 
the Uruguay round of negotiations, first met in January 1986.27 The round of 
negotiations had a broad mandate to extend trade rules to areas that had 
previously been difficult to liberalise and also newly emerging relevant areas, 
such as intellectual property rights and investment policies.28 The Preparatory 
Committee eventually agrees on a Declaration that sets out the general scope, 
objectives, and principles that steer subsequent negotiations. During the work of 
the Preparatory Committee, the U.S. delegation submitted a proposal to include 
the issue of worker rights within the ensuing negotiations.29 This proposal, on 25 
June 1986, suggested the review of the effect of denial of worker rights on 
Contracting Parties and consideration of the best possible ways to deal with the 
issue within the GATT framework. This proposal was discussed during the 
Preparatory Committee’s meeting on 13 August 1986 and was met with much 
opposition.30 Of the 22 delegations31 to comment on the U.S. proposal, fifteen 
were against the inclusion of worker rights in the Declaration that would 
preclude negotiations. 32  In general, the opposition were worried at the 
potentially protectionist impact that could result from arbitrary application of 
any provisions.33 These concerns were accompanied by issues relating to how to 
define “worker rights” and assess compliance by Contracting Parties,34 as well as 
a belief that the ILO was best placed to deal with such issues and “worker rights” 
fell outwith the scope of the jurisdiction of the GATT.35 The delegations that 
                                                        
27 Preparatory Committee, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, “Note on First Meeting”, (31 
January 1986), PREP.COM(86) 1. 
28 Ibid., § 4. 
29 Preparatory Committee, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, “Worker Rights”, (25 June 
1986), PREP.COM(86)W/83. 
30 Preparatory Committee, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, “Record of Discussions; 
Discussions of 23-26 June”, (13 August 1986), PREP.COM(86)SR/8, (hereinafter “Preparatory 
Committee, GATT, “Discussion on Worker Rights”, (1986)”), §§ 43-65. 
31 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Gabon, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Singapore, South Korea, U.S., Uruguay, Yugoslavia, 
Zaire, and  Zimbabwe, see Preparatory Committee, GATT, “Discussion on Worker Rights”, (1986), 
§§ 43-65. 
32 Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Singapore, South Korea, and Zaire, see Preparatory Committee, GATT, 
“Discussion on Worker Rights”, (1986), §§ 43-65. 
33 For example, Argentina; New Zealand; and, Hong Kong. See Preparatory Committee, GATT, 
“Discussion on Worker Rights”, (1986), §§ 44, 56, and 61 respectively. 
34 Argentina and Malaysia, Preparatory Committee, GATT, “Discussion on Worker Rights”, (1986), 
§§ 44 and 51 respectively. 
35 South Korea; Brazil; Cuba; Romania; and, Peru, see Preparatory Committee, GATT, “Discussion 
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opposed the U.S. proposal were generally developing countries in South America 
and Asia. However, most African countries were interested in discussing the 
issue further. The proposal was also supported by Chile and Yugoslavia, who 
were particularly interested in discussing the issue of free movement of labour 
forces and looking at worker rights as a global, as opposed to a national, issue.36 
In the resultant Ministerial Declaration, the issue of “worker rights” was not to 
be discussed during the Uruguay round of negotiations.37 However, the issue was 
not discarded and it was agreed that future discussions were necessary.38  
 
The negotiations were seen as groundbreaking within the regime of 
international trade. The negotiations liberalised trade in areas such as 
agriculture, textiles, and cross-border services.39 Additionally, at an institutional 
level, the Marrakesh Agreement, signed at the end of negotiations, replaced the 
GATT Secretariat with the WTO.40 During the first Ministerial Conference of the 
WTO, held during 1996 in Singapore, the decision not to link trade and labour 
issues was reaffirmed. Despite including a commitment from WTO members to 
observe “internationally recognised core labour standards”, 41  the WTO 
reinforced the fact that the ILO remained the competent body to deal with labour 
issues.42 No further declarations on the issue of labour have been made by the 
WTO and, in fact, the Singapore Declaration has been reaffirmed by the WTO at 
subsequent Ministerial Conferences.43 
 
The above constitutes a historical account of the link between the issues of trade 
and labour within the WTO, and preceding frameworks. Originally, States 
                                                                                                                                                              
on Worker Rights”, (1986), §§ 49, 53, 54, 58, and 65 respectively. 
36 See Preparatory Committee, GATT, “Discussion on Worker Rights”, (1986), §§ 52 and 63 
respectively. 
37 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, “Punta del Este Declaration”, (20 September 1986), 
MIN(86)/W/19. 
38 Bhatnagar, H. and Mishra, V. V., “Workers rights vis-à-vis the WTO: Do we need a paradigm 
shift?”, (2008), Hibernian Law Journal, Vol. 8, page 188. 
39 Cline, W. R., “Evaluating the Uruguay Round”, (1995), World Economy , Volume 18:1, page 1. 
40 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, (15 April 1994), UR-94-0083, page 9, commonly 
known as the “Marrakesh Agreement”. 
41 WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, (13 December 1996), WT/MIN(96)/DEC, at 4. 
42 Ibid. 
43 WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, (14 November 2001), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, at 8. 
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recognised that differing domestic labour laws could have international 
consequences. However, international bodies established in the latter part of the 
20th century that regulate international trade have stopped short of formalising a 
link between international trade and domestic labour standards. The attempt by 
the U.S. to firstly bring worker rights issues within the jurisdiction of the GATT 
dispute settlement regime were rejected in 1953. Following this, the proposal to 
further discuss worker rights during negotiations that resulted in the WTO were 
not supported by a number of States due to issues surrounding the potentially 
protectionist impact of inclusion within the international trade regime. The WTO 
has subsequently reaffirmed the decision not to include a formal link between 
trade and labour rights in several Ministerial Declarations. 
 
In order to provide a full background to the issue, the arguments advanced by 
scholars, and States, on either side of the debate are worthy of consideration in 
order to provide a full background to the issue. 
 
2.2. – For and against the link 
 
With regards to the reasons advanced for inclusion of labour standards 
provisions within international trade frameworks it is necessary to make a 
distinction between the two principal arguments.44 The first is motivated by 
preventing the so-called “race-to-the-bottom” and ensuring that labour 
standards within a State are not reduced. The second is based on the belief that 
international trade mechanisms can be used in order to actually increase the 
level of protection with regard to labour rights.  
 
The first motivation is economic in nature and stems from the belief that 
producers that fail to comply with labour standards have an advantage in the 
international trade forum. Non-compliance with labour standards allows 
producers to take advantage of lower wages and alternative sources of labour, 
including child labour, in order to drastically lower production costs. As a result, 
                                                        
44 Rodrik, D., “Labor Standards in International Trade: Do They Matter and What Do We Do About 
Them?” in Lawrence, R. Z., Rodrik, D., and Whalley, J. (eds.), “Emerging Agenda for Global Trade: 
High Stakes for Developing Countries”, (1996), page 5. 
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these producers in exporting States can undercut domestic producers to the 
detriment of the domestic workforce and economy.45 Despite the US proposals 
for inclusion of labour rights within the competency of the WTO being allegedly 
motivated by the fact that such rights were referred to in the preamble to the 
GATT,46 Article XX,47  and Article XXIX,48  many scholars believe that these 
economic reasons were the real motivation.49 These concerns are further 
increased due to the greater mobility of capital in modern times which affords 
businesses the opportunity to establish manufacturing centres and import goods 
from a wider range of international destinations. Consequently, this results in 
the potential for producers to lower production costs, by failing to comply with 
labour standards, in order to attract further foreign business and potential 
investment. This can result in a “race to the bottom” amongst developing States 
where each State attempts to “outbid” the others in order to appear the most 
attractive.50 Preventing this phenomenon, known as “social-dumping”, is a 
further strand of the economic motivations for a link between trade and 
compliance with labour standards.51  
 
In addition to the above economic reasons, more altruistic avenues of thinking 
have been advanced in order to justify the link. For some, the potential for 
international trade mechanisms to increase respect for labour standards in 
certain States should be a sufficient reason to include them within the 
                                                        
45 These motivations were evident in the adoption of a specific labour orientated side-agreement 
to the NAFTA as discussed below in Chapter 3.2. 
46 Preamble to the GATT, (July 1986) – “relations (…) should be conducted with a view to raising 
the standards of living”. 
47 Article XX(e), GATT, (July 1986) – relating to restriction of products of prison labour. 
48 Article XXIX, GATT, (July 1986) – covering the relation of the GATT to the Havana Charter – 
“The contracting parties undertake to observe to the fullest extent (…) the general principles (…) of 
the Havana Charter”. 
49 See Charnovitz, S., “The World Trade Organisation and Social Issues”, (1994), Journal of World 
Trade, Vol.28:5, page 17 and Bhatnagar, H. and Mishra, V. V., “Workers rights vis-à-vis the WTO: Do 
we need a paradigm shift?”, (2008), Hibernian Law Journal, Vol. 8, page 187. 
50 “Race to the bottom” is when “states compete with each other as each tries to underbid the 
others in lowering taxes, spending, regulation (including labour standards … so as to make itself 
more attractive to outside financial interests”,  Schram, S., “After Welfare: The Culture of 
Postindustrial Social Policy”, (2000), page 91. 
51 Caire, G., “Labour Standards and International Trade” in International Institute for Labour 
Studies, “International Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence: Essays in 
Commemoration of the 75th Anniversary of the International Labour Organisation and the 50th 
Anniversary of the Declaration of Philladelphia”, (1994), (hereinafter “ILS, “Commemorative 
Volume”, (1994)”), page 298.  
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international trade framework. Labour rights are a part of the doctrine of 
universal human rights and, therefore, there exists a moral obligation to improve 
them whenever possible. 52  Additionally, an objective of increased trade 
liberalisation is to “raise the general standard of living of … people”.53 This aim 
was used by the U.S. to justify the formalisation of the link between trade and 
labour at a multi-lateral level during discussion prior to the establishment of the 
WTO.54 Linking trade and worker rights were seen as a means to ensure that the 
“fruits of economic development” were shared amongst all.55 Concerns relating 
to ethical globalisation are also shared by corporations as a result of the growing 
importance placed upon a company portraying a positive image.56 Alleged 
complicity with poor labour practices can have a damaging impact on the 
reputation of a company. This provides strong motivation for the improvement 
of labour standards in manufacturing and exporting countries.  
 
Previously, potential trade restrictions have been used as a means to further 
concerns regarding both environmental57 and intellectual property issues.58 
However, with regards to labour rights, the ILO has no formal sanctioning 
powers and the WTO has been, as discussed above, unwilling to formally bring 
worker rights within their jurisdiction. Accordingly, many social advocates see 
bilateral and regional trade agreements as a powerful tool in order to affect the 
improvement of labour standards in foreign countries. 59  Increased social 
                                                        
52 Brown, A. G. and Stern, R. M., “What are the issues in using trade agreements for improving 
international labor standards?”, (2007), Discussion paper No. 558, University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor. 
53 Preamble to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (1947). 
54 Preparatory Committee, GATT, “Discussion on Worker Rights”, (1986), § 45. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Artuso, M. and McLarney, C., “A Race to the Top: Should Labour Standards be Included in Trade 
Agreements?”, (2015), The Journal for Decision Makers, Volume 40:1, page 9. 
57 See Kerr, W. A., “The World Trade Organization and the environment”, in Michelman, H. J., Rude, 
J., Stabler, J. and Storey, G. (eds.), “Globalization and Agricultural Trade Policy”, (2001), pages 53-
65 and Holtby, K. L., Kerr, W. A. and Hobbs, J. E., “International Liability and Barriers to Trade”, 
(2007). 
58 For example, WTO, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, (15 April 
1994). The sanctioning power of the GATT was a major motivation for having such issues 
incorporated within the WTO regime, see Bakhsi, S., and Kerr, W. A., “Do Labour Standards Have a 
Role in International Trade?: Private Standards, Preferential Trade Agreements or the WTO”, 
(2009), CATPRN Working Paper 2009-07, page 6. 
59 Bakhsi, S. and Kerr, W. A., “Do Labour Standards Have a Role in International Trade?: Private 
Standards, Preferential Trade Agreements or the WTO”, (2009), CATPRN Working Paper 2009-07, 
page 5. 
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protection and respect for labour rights is best brought about via political 
negotiation; leaving the issue to market forces is insufficient.60 Accordingly, the 
strength of trade agreements as a means to achieve this end is further reinforced.  
 
However, contrary to this position, some scholars believe that a free trade 
market is sufficient enough to ensure adequate social protection.61 Employers 
who fail to offer safe working conditions or reasonable wages will be unable to 
retain their workers and will thus lose the many benefits of a stable workforce 
unless these shortcomings are improved.62 The imposition of labour standards 
within the international trade framework could be considered a distorting factor 
that impedes efficiency, stifles competition, and constrains growth.63 These 
labour standards, in effect, fix an aspect of market diversity and, in this regard, 
run contrary to one of the fundamental principles behind the entire international 
free trade regime; the exploitation of comparative advantages that certain States 
have. This counterargument formed one of the bases of concern raised during 
the WTO negotiations which lead to a refusal to formalise a link between trade 
and labour issues as outlined above.64 This alleged form of protectionism 
nullifies the comparative advantage that many developing states enjoy and, 
according to certain scholars, this can have wide ranging negative consequences. 
On a wider level, protectionism in the form of imposition of labour standards 
could result in cost equalisation that could be detrimental to the world 
economy.65 Potter uses the U.S. Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, which provided the 
President with the power to adjust tariffs in order to equate costs between 
international and domestic products, in order to exemplify these potential 
negative consequences. The Act’s intention was to counteract the low labour 
costs in exporting countries that had resulted in economic difficulties that 
                                                        
60 De Wet, E., “Labor Standards in the Globalized Economy: The Inclusion of a Social Clause in the 
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade/World Trade Organisation”, (1995), Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol.17:3, page 447. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Alston, P., “Post-post Modernism and International Labour Standards: The Quest for a New 
Complexity” in ILS, “Commemorative Volume”, (1994). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Bhatnagar, H. and Mishra, V. V., “Workers rights vis-à-vis the WTO: Do we need a paradigm 
shift?”, (2008), Hibernian Law Journal, Vol. 8, pages 187-188. 
65  Potter, E., “International Labour Standards, the Global Economy and Trade” in ILS, 
“Commemorative Volume”, (1994), page 363. 
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particularly affected the agriculture industry.66 Instead, it stifled international 
trade and caused unemployment that lasted until the Second World War.67 The 
ILO, in advocating the need for “social clauses” to not be solely aimed at 
instances of social-dumping, potentially shares the fears surrounding the issue of 
cost-equalisation. 68  However, despite the fact that “social clauses” may 
inadvertently raise the costs of production, this is a large step from artificially 
raising the costs of production to match domestic costs. The link between labour 
standards and trade issues would not automatically constitute cost equalisation. 
What should be noted is the fact that such clauses focus upon non-compliance 
with labour standards, often the source of lower costs, and are not aimed at 
equalising the cost of products on a global scale.69 The introduction of labour 
standards would not result in cost equalisation and, in many cases, would not 
eradicate the comparative advantage of developing countries as production 
costs, and wages, will generally correlate to the GDP per capita of the State.70  
 
2.3. – Conclusion 
 
The above has charted the development of the discussion surrounding the link 
between trade and labour standards, alongside the arguments advanced in 
favour and against such a link. As can be seen there has been a sustained 
reluctance to formalise the link between trade and worker rights at an 
international level. Concerns relating to the potential protectionist effect of the 
                                                        
66 Irwin, D. A., “From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements: Changing the Course of U.S. 
Trade Policy in the 1930s”, page 334, in Bordo, M. D., Goldin, C. and White, E. N., (eds.), “The 
Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century”, 
(1998). 
67 Ibid. The proposed Act had been subject to a statement of 1,028 economists who believed 
increased protective duties would be a mistake and requested revision of the Act by Congress, or, 
if passed veto by the President, see Fetter, F. W., “The Economists’ Tariff Protest of 1930”, (1942), 
American Economic Review, Volume 32:2, pages 355-356, reprinted in Economic Journal Watch, 
(2007), Volume 4:3, pages 345-358. 
68 De Wet, E., “Labor Standards in the Globalized Economy: The Inclusion of a Social Clause in the 
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade/World Trade Organisation”, (1995), Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol.17:3, page 450 citing ILO, Director-General, “Defending Values, Promoting Change”, 
(1994), at 59 - “it would Utopian (…) to think that we could legislate a standardisation of labour 
costs”. 
69 Marshall, R., “The Importance of International Labour Standards in a More Competitive Global 
Economy”, in ILS, “Commemorative Volume”, (1994), page 71. 
70 Secretary of Labour, United States, “9 International Labour Conference Provisional Record”, 10 
(1994), page 3. 
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link, and the fact that it may erode the competitive advantage of developing 
States, have motivated this stance. Despite these concerns, in the years since the 
above noted discussion, there have been a number of trade instruments adopted 
that have included “social clauses” recognising the link between trade and 
labour.  
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Chapter 3 – Free Trade Agreements  
 
3.1. – Introduction  
 
The following shall be an outline of the mechanisms contained within concluded 
Free Trade Agreements that include “social clauses” aiming to protect labour 
rights. The provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter 
“NAFTA”) and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (hereinafter 
“NAALC”), the first group of agreements to include such a mechanism, shall be 
set out first, followed by the approaches taken within subsequent agreements 
concluded by the United States, the EU, and Canada. The outline shall focus upon 
the rights covered within such agreements, the obligations of the Parties to the 
agreement, and the mechanisms for implementation and enforcement of these 
obligations. 
 
3.2. – North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
 
Following the success of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, the Mexican 
President Carlos Salinas wished to be part of a similar agreement with the U.S. 
and Canada. Negotiations resulted in the signature of the NAFTA on 17 
December 1992. Before the agreement came into force, however, it required to 
be ratified by the three contracting parties. At this point, within the U.S. a 
Presidential election campaign was ongoing. The incumbent George H. Bush, 
heralded the NAFTA as a major achievement of his administration.71 On the 
other hand, the Democratic candidate, Bill Clinton, was under pressure from 
environmental and labour organisations to denounce the NAFTA. However, 
financial institutions that had supported Clinton’s campaign were in favour of 
the NAFTA and so a compromise was the only realistic conclusion. Clinton 
agreed to support ratification of the NAFTA provided two side agreements, on 
labour and the environment, were also signed. One of these side agreements, the 
                                                        
71 Compa, L., “Chapter 6 – A Glass Half Full: The NAFTA Labor Agreement and Cross-Border Labor 
Action”, page 140 in Andreopoulos, G. J. (ed.), “Concepts and Strategies in International Human 
Rights Law”, (2002). 
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NAALC which covered labour issues, was motivated by the deficiency in 
protection of labour rights of Mexican workers and the potential detrimental 
effect this could have on the U.S. economy.72 With Mexican workers willing to 
work for $0.58 per hour instead of the U.S. minimum wage of $4.25, many were 
worried that U.S. companies would relocate South to take advantage of these 
savings.73 Following Clinton’s victory in the election, the NAALC and NAAEC 
were signed on 13 September 1993 and came in to force on 1 January 1994.  
 
The NAALC, in contrast to certain agreements that shall be discussed below, is a 
non-invasive regime that does not require Parties to enact new domestic 
legislation, but merely requires effective implementation of pre-existing 
domestic laws.74 The agreement, however, does oblige parties to respect the 
following eleven labour principles: 
  
1. Freedom of association and protection of the right to organise 
2. The right to collective bargaining 
3. The right to strike 
4. Prohibition of forced labour 
5. Labour protections for children and young persons 
6. Minimum employment standards 
7. Elimination of employment discrimination 
8. Equal pay for women and men 
9. Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses 
10. Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses 
11. Protection of migrant workers75 
 
These eleven principles are split into three “groups”: Group One relates to 
principles 1, 2, and 3; Group Two relates to principles 4, 6 (in relation to 
                                                        
72 Brower, A., “Rethinking NAFTA’s NAALC Provision: The Effectiveness of its Dispute Resolution 
System on the Protection of Mexican Migrant Workers in the United States”, (2008), Independent 
International and Comparative Law Review, Volume 18:1, page 156. 
73 See footnote 44. 
74 Articles 2 and 5, U.S., Canada, and Mexico, “North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation”, 
(13 September 1993), (hereinafter “NAALC, (1993)”). 
75 Article 49 and Annex 1, NAALC, (1993). 
22 
 
overtime), 7, 8, 10, and 11; and Group Three includes principles 5, 6 (in relation 
to payment of a minimum wage), and 9.76 These groups are especially important 
in the context of the NAALC’s complicated dispute resolution system. This 
resolution system involves a number of bodies that have been established under 
the NAALC. 
 
Part 3 of the NAALC establishes the Commission for Labour Cooperation which 
consists of a Council and a supplementary Secretariat. The Council, consisting of 
labour ministers from the Contracting Parties,77 oversees the implementation of 
the agreement and facilitates the inter-Party consultations that form part of the 
dispute resolution system. 78  In addition to the Commission for Labor 
Cooperation, the agreement requires Parties to establish a National 
Administrative Office (hereinafter “NAO”). The most important role for the NAOs 
is to receive independent communications from individuals, or other interested 
parties, on labour law matters that arise in the territory of another contracting 
party.79 Such submissions can be made by an individual, trade union, or other 
organisation and no citizenship requirements to make a submission exist.80 Once 
the NAO has received the submission it shall review the substance of the 
submission and, with the assistance of the NAO in the contracting party which is 
the subject of the submission,81 produce a report on the issue. If the report finds 
that there has been a failure to implement domestic law relating to one of the 
above outlined labour principles, then “ministerial consultations” can be 
requested between the relevant Parties.82 Following these consultations it is 
general practice that the Parties will conclude a “ministerial declaration” that 
shall outline any steps to be taken in order to remedy any shortcomings in the 
implementation of domestic law. If the issues concern a Group One labour 
                                                        
76 U.S. Department of State, Boller, M.J. (author), “CRS Report for Congress: NAFTA Labor Side 
Agreement: Lessons for the Worker Rights and Fast-Track Debate”, (11 January 2002), CRS-4, 
Figure 1. 
77 Article 9(1), NAALC, (1993). 
78 Article 10(1), NAALC, (1993). 
79 Article 16(3), NAALC, (1993). 
80 Compa, L., “Chapter 6 – A Glass Half Full: The NAFTA Labor Agreement and Cross-Border Labor 
Action”, page 142 in Andreopoulos, G. J. (ed.), “Concepts and Strategies in International Human 
Rights Law”, (2002). 
81 Article 21, NAALC, (1993). 
82 Article 21(1), NAALC, (1993). 
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principle83 then no further actions are available under the NAALC procedure. 
However, if the issues relate to a Group Two or Three issue, then the matter can 
continue on to an Evaluation Committee of Experts (hereinafter “ECE”). 
 
The ECE, consisting of three independent experts, analyses the enforcement and 
implementation of the domestic labour laws that form the basis of the 
submission.84 The ECE are assisted by the NAOs of the relevant Parties and also 
the Commission’s Secretariat. The ECE then produce a draft report, which can 
include practical recommendations on how to resolve the issue,85 that the Parties 
subsequently submit written comments on. The ECE are then obliged to take 
these written comments into account when producing a final, non-binding 
report.86 If the matter relates to a Group Three issue,87 then there are further 
steps in the NAALC dispute settlement procedure that may be utilised. Following 
another round of cooperative consultations between the parties, the matter can 
proceed to an Arbitral Panel if there has been a “persistent pattern of failure” by 
a Party to implement domestic labour law in a trade related matter.88 This 
Arbitral Panel has the power to impose both monetary fines and, eventually, 
restriction of trade benefits that are enjoyed under the NAFTA.89 
 
The procedure in the NAALC is characterised by a high importance placed upon 
public communications, which form the first step in the dispute settlement 
system. Additionally, due to the non-invasive nature of the agreement, the 
obligations purely relate to non-implementation of existing domestic laws in 
relation to the eleven labour principles. As has been outlined, the available 
enforcement procedures within the NAALC differ depending on which labour 
principles are impacted upon, thus creating a hierarchy amongst labour 
                                                        
83 Containing three of the ILO’s Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: the freedom of 
association and the right to organise, the right to collective bargaining, and the implied right to 
strike. See ILO, “Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work”, (1998), ILO, Freedom 
of Association and the Right to Organise Convention (No.87), (1948), and ILO, Right to Organise 
and Collective Bargaining Convention (No.98), (1949). 
84 Articles 23 and 24, NAALC, (1993). 
85 Article 25(1), NAALC, (1993). 
86 Article 25, NAALC, (1993). 
87 Child Labour, Occupational Health and Safety, or employment standards relating to minimum 
wage. 
88 Article 29, NAALC, (1993). 
89 Article 39, NAALC, (1993). 
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principles. The extent to which these enforcement procedures have been utilised 
shall be fully examined in Chapter 4. 
 
3.3. – United States Free Trade Agreements 
 
Since the adoption of the NAFTA, and the corresponding NAALC side agreement, 
the U.S. has subsequently entered in to a number of Free Trade Agreements with 
various other States. All of these agreements, apart from the Free Trade 
Agreement concluded with Israel,90 contain social clauses that intend to uphold 
respect for fundamental labour rights. Of the eleven agreements containing such 
provisions, there are both a number of common features and fundamental 
differences.  
 
3.3.1. – Obligations 
 
With regards to the obligations that are accepted by the Parties to Free Trade 
Agreements with the U.S. there are common provisions relating to the 
implementation of domestic laws that protect fundamental labour rights. The 
obligations relating to implementation prohibit Parties from failing to implement 
domestic labour laws through sustained action/inaction in a manner that affects 
trade or investment.91 However, these provisions also include a caveat that 
decisions taken to enforce other labour protections, in exercise of discretion or 
                                                        
90 U.S.-Israel, Free Trade Agreement, (22 April 1985).   
91 Chapter 15, Article 2(1)(a), U.S.-Australia, Free Trade Agreement, (18 May 2004), (hereinafter 
“U.S.-Australia, FTA, (2004)”); Chapter 15, Article 2(1)(a), U.S.-Bahrain, Free Trade Agreement, 
(14 September 2004), (hereinafter “U.S.-Bahrain, FTA, (2004)”); Chapter 16, Article 2(1)(a), U.S.-
Dominican Republic-Central America, Free Trade Agreement, (5 August 2004), (hereinafter “U.S.-
DR-CA, FTA, (2004)”); Chapter 18, Article 2(1)(a), U.S.-Chile, “Free Trade Agreement”, (6 June 
2003), (hereinafter “U.S.-Chile, FTA, (2003)”); Chapter 17, Article 3(1)(a), U.S.-Colombia, “Free 
Trade Agreement”, (22 November 2006), (hereinafter “U.S.-Colombia, FTA, (2006)”); Chapter 6, 
Article 4(a), U.S.-Jordan, “Free-Trade Agreement”, (24 October 2000); Chapter 19, Article 3(1)(a), 
U.S.-Korea, “Free Trade Agreement”, (30 June 2007), (hereinafter “U.S.-Korea, FTA, (2007)”); 
Chapter 16, Article 2(1)(a), U.S.-Morocco, “Free Trade Agreement”, (15 June 2004), (hereinafter 
“U.S.-Morocco, FTA, (2004)”); Chapter 16, Article 2(1)(a), U.S.-Oman, “Free Trade Agreement”, 
(19 January 2006), (hereinafter “U.S.-Oman, FTA, (2006)”); Chapter 16, Article 3(1)(a), U.S.-
Panama, “Free Trade Agreement”, (28 June 2007), (hereinafter “U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007)”); 
Chapter 17, Article 3(1)(a), U.S.-Peru, “Free Trade Agreement”, (12 April 2006), (hereinafter 
“U.S.-Peru, FTA, (2006)”); Chapter 17, Article 2(1)(a), U.S.-Singapore, “Free Trade Agreement”, (6 
May 2003), (hereinafter “U.S.-Singapore, FTA, (2003)”). 
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relating to the allocation of resources, will not fall foul of this obligation.92 
Accordingly, in order to rely upon the procedures outlined below the 
complaining Party must demonstrate that a practice by the respondent State 
satisfies a number of criteria. In addition to this obligation, the agreements 
concluded by the U.S. also include common provisions that prohibit Parties from 
derogating from, or waiving, domestic labour laws in a manner that affects trade 
or investment and undermines labour rights.93 In effect, this provision prevents 
against “social dumping”.94 However, although the form of these obligations is 
consistent amongst the agreements, their content differs due to the divergence in 
definitions of “labour laws” contained within the agreements.  
 
The agreements concluded between the U.S. and Australia, Bahrain, the 
Dominican Republic and Central America, Chile, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, and 
Singapore, include a definition of “labour laws” as laws relating to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, the prohibition of forced and child labour, 
and minimum standards of employment.95 However, those concluded with 
Colombia, Korea, Panama, and Peru, also include the abolition of discrimination 
in employment within this definition.96 Further, the latter group of agreements 
also impose upon the parties the need to adopt domestic labour laws relating to 
these labour issues97; an obligation that is missing from the other agreements. 
Not only do the agreements contain different obligations relating to different 
rights, but the mechanisms for implementation of these obligations also differ. 
The agreements concluded by the U.S. generally contain two different 
enforcement and implementation systems which shall be set out in turn, after 
the initial steps, common to both systems, are outlined. 
 
                                                        
92 Ibid. – paragraph (b). 
93 For example Chapter 18, Article 2(2), U.S.-Australia, FTA, (2004); Chapter 17, Article 2(2), U.S.-
Colombia, FTA, (2006); and, Chapter 19, Article 1(2), U.S.-Korea, FTA, (2007). 
94 See footnote 50. 
95 “Minimum employment standards” includes issues such as “Occupational Health and Safety 
and the need to establish and enforce a minimum wage”. 
96 Chapter 17, Article 2(1), U.S.-Colombia, FTA, (2006); Chapter 19, Article 2(1), U.S.-Korea, FTA, 
(2007); Chapter 16, Article 2(1), U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007); and, Chapter 17, Article 2(1), U.S.-
Peru, FTA, (2006). 
97 Ibid. 
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3.3.2. – Enforcement and Implementation procedures 
 
If a Party to any of the U.S. Free Trade Agreements has an issue with regards to 
compliance by another Party then the initial step is to resolve this through 
cooperative consultations.98 A number of agreements include the need to 
establish domestic bodies to receive public submissions on implementation 
issues.99 As discussed below,100 this often results in the initiation of consultations 
following an examination by this domestic body of the substance of the 
submission. An emphasis is placed upon the resolution of the issue at the stage. 
However, in the event that consultation between the parties do not result in 
resolution of the issue, or alleged non-compliance with obligations, then the 
complaining Party can refer the issue to a body established by the agreement.101 
The body, generally called the “Sub-Committee on Legal Affairs” or the “Labour 
Affairs Council”, consists of cabinet-level representatives from the Parties’ 
Governments. Their attempts to resolve the issue of non-compliance can involve 
mediation and the consultation of outside technical experts and advisors. At this 
point, if the issue has not been resolved, there are different avenues available for 
resolution dependent upon the obligations and agreements concerned.  
 
Within the agreements concluded with Colombia, Korea, Panama, and Peru, any 
issue of non-compliance with obligations relating to labour standards in trade 
related matters can be referred to the main body mandated with implementation 
of the agreement.102 The dispute settlement system that can be utilised in such 
circumstances is the same that is used in issues that relate to all issues of non-
compliance under the entire agreement. This body will then attempt to mutually 
resolve the situation before the complaining Party has the ability to refer the 
                                                        
98 For example, Chapter 18, Article 6(1), U.S.-Australia, FTA, (2004). 
99 For example, Chapter 18, Article 4, U.S.-Australia, FTA, (2004); Chapter 15, Article 4(2), U.S.-
Bahrain, FTA, (2004); Chapter 16, Article 4(3), U.S.-DR-CA, FTA, (2004); and, Chapter 17, Article 
5(5), U.S.-Colombia, FTA, (2006). 
100 Chapter 4.2.3-4.2.7. 
101 For example, Chapter 18, Article 6(3), U.S.-Australia, FTA, (2004). 
102 Chapter 21, Article 5(2), U.S.-Colombia, FTA, (2006); Chapter 22, Article 8(2), U.S.-Korea, FTA, 
(2007); Chapter 20, Article 5(2), U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007); and, Chapter 21, Article 5(2), U.S.-
Peru, FTA, (2006). 
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issue to a Panel.103 This Panel normally consists of three members and considers 
both oral and written submissions of the Parties before producing a report 
which contains findings of fact, whether there has been non-compliance with 
obligations under the agreement, and recommendations for resolution if the 
Parties have requested them.104 The Parties then enter in to negotiations, taking 
in to account the report of the Panel, in order to resolve the issue. If the Parties 
fail to reach an agreement on how to resolve the non-compliance, or an 
agreement has been reached but not honoured by the respondent Party, then the 
Parties enter in to a further round of negotiations to determine monetary 
compensation.105 If they fail to reach an agreement on this, or an agreement is 
reached and not honoured, then the complaining Party has the ability to suspend 
trade benefits to a level equivalent to the effect on trade that the non-compliance 
has had.106 This proposed restriction can be challenged by the respondent Party 
and even substituted for an annual monetary assessment of half the proposed 
value of the restrictions.107 There are no limits to the level of these restrictions of 
trade benefits or annual monetary assessments; they merely have to be 
proportionate to the damage caused by the non-compliance. These measures are 
intended to be temporary. Accordingly, the respondent Party has the ability to 
reconvene the Panel in the event that the non-compliance has been rectified in 
order to remove such measures.108 
 
With regards to the systems in other agreements including Australia, Bahrain, 
                                                        
103 Chapter 21, Article 6(1), U.S.-Colombia, FTA, (2006); Chapter 22, Article 9(1), U.S.-Korea, FTA, 
(2007); Chapter 20, Article 6(1), U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007); and, Chapter 21, Article 6(1), U.S.-
Peru, FTA, (2006). 
104 Chapter 21, Article 13, U.S.-Colombia, FTA, (2006); Chapter 22, Article 11, U.S.-Korea, FTA, 
(2007); Chapter 20, Article 12, U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007); and, Chapter 21, Article 13, U.S.-Peru, 
FTA, (2006). 
105 Chapter 21, Article 16(1), U.S.-Colombia, FTA, (2006); Chapter 22, Article 13(1), U.S.-Korea, 
FTA, (2007); Chapter 20, Article 15(1), U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007); and, Chapter 21, Article 16(1), 
U.S.-Peru, FTA, (2006). 
106 Chapter 21, Article 16(2), U.S.-Colombia, FTA, (2006); Chapter 22, Article 13(2), U.S.-Korea, 
FTA, (2007); Chapter 20, Article 15(2), U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007); and, Chapter 21, Article 16(2), 
U.S.-Peru, FTA, (2006). 
107 Chapter 21, Article 16(3) and (6), U.S.-Colombia, FTA, (2006); Chapter 22, Article 13(3) and 
(5), U.S.-Korea, FTA, (2007); Chapter 20, Article 15(3) and (6), U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007); and, 
Chapter 21, Article 16(3) and (6), U.S.-Peru, FTA, (2006). 
108 Chapter 21, Article 17, U.S.-Colombia, FTA, (2006); Chapter 22, Article 14, U.S.-Korea, FTA, 
(2007); Chapter 20, Article 16, U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007); and, Chapter 21, Article 17, U.S.-Peru, 
FTA, (2006). 
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the Dominican Republic and Central America, Chile, Morocco, Oman, and 
Singapore enforcement proceedings beyond cabinet-level consultations outlined 
are only available when a Party has failed to implement domestic labour laws.109 
As mentioned above, this requires a Party to show that there was a continued 
failure to implement these laws in a manner that affected a fundamental right 
and related to trade or investment. Additionally, the issue will not be considered 
as non-compliance if it related to a bona fide decision to allocate resources to 
enforcement of other labour rights or an exercise of discretion. However, if the 
issue does relate to such non-compliance then the complaining Party has the 
ability to request a Panel to be convened following another round of cooperative 
consultations, much in the same manner as above.110 Specific procedures exist if 
the Panel report adverse findings relating to non-implementation of domestic 
labour laws.111 If the Parties cannot agree on steps to address the non-
compliance, or a plan is agreed upon but not respected, the complaining Party 
may request the Panel to be reconvened in order to impose an annual monetary 
assessment upon the other Party.112 In determining this amount, a limit of 
$15million (U.S.) is imposed and the Panel should take in to account, amongst 
other factors, the resource constraints of the non-compliant Party.113 If this 
annual monetary assessment imposed by the Panel is not paid, only then may the 
complaining Party take any other necessary steps to collect the assessment 
whilst bearing in mind the objectives of the agreement.114 
 
With regards to the U.S.-Jordan FTA, the parties exchanged side-letters following 
conclusion of the agreement that stated a shared understanding that the dispute 
                                                        
109 For example, Chapter 18, Article 6(4), U.S.-Australia, FTA, (2004); Chapter 18, Article 6(6) and 
(7), U.S.-Chile, FTA, (2003); and, Chapter 16, Article 6(4) and (5), U.S.-Morocco, FTA, (2004). 
110 For example, Chapter 21, Article 7(1), U.S.-Australia, FTA, (2004); Chapter 22, Article 6(1), 
U.S.-Chile, FTA, (2003); and, Chapter 20, Article 7(1), U.S.-Morocco, FTA, (2004). 
111 For example, Chapter 21, Article 12, U.S.-Australia, FTA, (2004); Chapter 22, Article 16, U.S.-
Chile, FTA, (2003); and, Chapter 20, Article 12, U.S.-Morocco, FTA, (2004). 
112 For example, Chapter 21, Article 12(1), U.S.-Australia, FTA, (2004); Chapter 22, Article 16(1),  
U.S.-Chile, FTA, (2003); and, Chapter 20, Article 12(1), U.S.-Morocco, FTA, (2004). 
113 For example, Chapter 21, Article 12(2), U.S.-Australia, FTA, (2004); Chapter 22, Article 16(2), 
U.S.-Chile, FTA, (2003); and, Chapter 20, Article 12(2), U.S.-Morocco, FTA, (2004). 
114 “bearing in mind the Agreement’s objective of eliminating barriers to bilateral trade and while 
seeking to avoid unduly affecting parties or interests not party to the dispute.” - Chapter 21, 
Article 12(6), U.S.-Australia, FTA, (2004); Chapter 22, Article 16(5), U.S.-Chile, FTA, (2003); and, 
Chapter 20, Article 12(6), U.S.-Morocco, FTA, (2004). These necessary steps could include the 
restriction of trade benefits. 
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settlement procedures, and the potential for sanctions, would not be used in 
relation to issues concerning interpretation or application of the agreement.115  
 
The main difference between these two groups of agreements is the fact that the 
former allows access to the general dispute settlement system, and the ability to 
restrict trade benefits, for all issues of non-compliance with labour obligations. 
In such agreements this means that failure to enact domestic legislation to 
protect fundamental labour rights, including discrimination, or undertaking 
“social dumping” can be examined under the full dispute settlement system. 
However, the latter group of agreements only afford these procedures if the 
issue relates to non-implementation of domestic labour laws. Additionally, the 
ability to temporarily restrict trade benefits exists under both systems. In 
addition to the above implementation procedures, certain agreements set up 
mechanism for advanced cooperative efforts. All agreements concluded by the 
U.S. include an aspiration to increase cooperative activities, but some 
agreements go further in specifying the form that such cooperation should take.   
 
3.3.3. – Cooperation 
 
Certain agreements 116  include annexes that establish a specific “Labour 
Cooperation Mechanism”. The provisions of the agreement firstly set out specific 
issues that the programmes should focus upon, with the ability to add to this as 
necessary following consultation with interested parties and the public.117 The 
programmes unanimously include provisions to promote issues of 
discrimination in employment, despite some agreements excluding this from 
their definitions of “labour laws”. 118  Additionally, issues such as labour 
                                                        
115  USTR, “Side Letter on Dispute Settlement”, (23 July 2001) available at 
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005665.asp (last accessed 
5 May 2015). 
116 For example, U.S.-Bahrain, FTA, (2004); U.S.-DR-CA, FTA, (2004); U.S.-Chile, FTA, (2003), U.S.-
Colombia, FTA, (2006), U.S.-Korea, FTA, (2007), U.S.-Morocco, FTA, (2004), U.S.-Oman, FTA, 
(2006), U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007), U.S.-Peru, FTA, (2006), and U.S.-Singapore, FTA, (2003). 
117 For example, Annex 15-A, Article 6, U.S.-Bahrain, FTA, (2004); Annex 16.5, Article 5, U.S.-DR-
CA, FTA, (2004); and, Annex 16.6, Article 5, U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007). 
118 For example, Annex 15-A, Article 4(a), U.S.-Bahrain, FTA, (2004); Annex 16.5, Article 3(a), 
U.S.-DR-CA, FTA, (2004); and, Annex 16.6, Article 3(a), U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007). 
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administration and inspection issues,119 employment opportunities,120 gender 
issues,121 and compliance with labour rights by private enterprises122 appear in 
the provisions of the relevant agreements. The activities that such programmes 
intend to carry out include exchanges between the Parties of information, 
experts, and the organisation of seminars and conferences.123 Such cooperative 
activities are highlighted as providing a serious opportunity to improve labour 
standards in the Parties’ territory.124  
 
3.3.4. – United States – Cambodia Textile Agreement 
 
Following an era of civil strife from the 1960s-1980s, the Cambodian 
Government transformed a number of state-owned textile factories into a 
booming export industry. Due to Cambodia’s late entry into the market, they 
were not subject to the quota system that had governed the export industry 
relating to apparel and textiles for the previous 40 years.  The Cambodian 
apparel industry grew from almost no exports in 1994, to an industry worth half 
a billion U.S. Dollars by 1998.125 Whilst this industry grew, individuals in both 
the U.S. and Cambodia were harbouring growing discontent. The U.S. domestic 
textile and apparel industry was concerned with the high level of cheap, quota-
free imports. Additionally, the Cambodian workforce was concerned with 
working conditions. Demonstrations and strikes that were carried out in protest 
were supported by U.S. labour groups that petitioned to U.S. Government to 
review workers’ rights abuses.126 These concerns developed the background for 
negotiations between the U.S. and Cambodia on how best to address all the 
relevant concerns. 
                                                        
119 Annex 16.6, Article 3(d), U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007). 
120 Annex 16.5, Article 3(k), U.S.-DR-CA, FTA, (2004). 
121 Annex 15-A, Article 4(f), U.S.-Bahrain, FTA, (2004). 
122 Annex 18.5, Article 4(d), U.S.-Chile, FTA, (2003); Annex 17.6, Article 2(p), U.S.-Colombia, FTA, 
(2006); and, Annex 17.6, Article 2(p), U.S.-Peru, FTA, (2006). 
123 For example, Annex 15-A, Article 5, U.S.-Bahrain, FTA, (2004); Annex 16.5, Article 4, U.S.-DR-
CA, FTA, (2004); and, Annex 16.6, Article 4, U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007). 
124 For example, Annex 15-A, Article 1, U.S.-Bahrain, FTA, (2004); Chapter 16, Article 5(1), U.S.-
DR-CA, FTA, (2004); and, Chapter 16, Article 6(1), U.S.-Panama, FTA, (2007). 
125 International Monetary Fund, “Cambodia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix”, (March 
2003), Country Report No. 03/59, page 9. 
126 Polaski, S., “Combining Global and Local Forces: The Case of Labor Rights in Cambodia”, (2006), 
World Development, Volume 34:5, page 3. 
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On 20 January 1999, the parties signed a textile trade agreement for the period 
of 1999-2001.127 The agreement was subsequently prolonged until 2005 when it 
finally expired. This expiration in 2005 coincided with the ending of the 
international apparel quota system that was the catalyst for the creation of the 
U.S.-Cambodia Textile Agreement.128 This agreement set quotas for the twelve 
largest groups of apparel exports. However, such quotas could be increased on 
an annual basis if the Cambodian Government could increase compliance levels 
of apparel factories with both “internationally recognized core labor 
standards”129 and domestic workers’ rights.130 These positive incentives for 
compliance with labour rights were an innovative feature of the U.S.-Cambodia 
Textile Agreement that is not evident in any other U.S. Trade Agreement. The 
parties also agreed to consultations twice a year on labour standards issues and 
compliance.131 Additionally, another innovative feature of the Textile Agreement 
was the use of the ILO as the body to undertake monitoring of the private sector 
factories. The Cambodian Government did not have the capacity to properly 
inspect, and no not-for-profit groups or organisations existed that had the 
appropriate levels of credibility to undertake monitoring. Despite the fact that 
the ILO had never previously undertaken on the ground monitoring of private 
firms, and the debate this provoked within the ILO, the ILO supported the 
project.132 The extent to which this innovative agreement was implemented in 
practice, and the results of ILO monitoring, shall be fully discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
3.3.5. – Conclusion 
 
The U.S. Trade Agreements discussed above contain a general trend of 
                                                        
127 U.S.-Cambodia, “Bilateral Textile Agreement”, (20 January 1999), (hereinafter “U.S.-Cambodia,  
Textile Agreement, (1999)”). 
128  Polaski, S., “Harnessing Global Forces to Create Decent Work in Cambodia”, (2009), 
International Institute for Labour Studies, page 7. 
129 Article 10(B), U.S.-Cambodia, Textile Agreement, (1999). The ILO, in subsequent reports, 
covered issues such as freedom of association, child labour, discrimination, occupational safety 
and health, and wages and overtime. See ILO, “Synthesis Reports on the Working Conditions 
Situation in Cambodia’s Garment Sector”, (2001-2004), Reports 1-8. 
130 Article 10(D), U.S.-Cambodia, Textile Agreement, (1999). 
131 Article 10(C), U.S.-Cambodia, Textile Agreement, (1999). 
132 Polaski, S., “Combining Global and Local Forces: The Case of Labor Rights in Cambodia”, (2006), 
World Development, Volume 34:5, page 4. 
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conditional trade benefits. In all agreements there exist obligations to not 
undertake social-dumping or fail to implement existing domestic labour laws. 
Additionally, agreements with Colombia, South Korea, Peru, and Panama include 
obligations to adopt domestic law protecting fundamental labour rights which, in 
contrast with the other U.S. agreements, includes discrimination alongside other 
rights. Failure to comply with certain obligations can result in restriction of trade 
benefits, or fines. However, in certain agreements there are further procedures 
that must be exhausted before recourse to such sanctions is afforded. The Textile 
Agreement concluded with Cambodia, in a departure from the above mentioned 
agreements, includes positive incentives to comply with labour standards. 
Increases in quotas that restrict access to the U.S. market can be applied in the 
event that Cambodia improves compliance with both international labour rights 
and domestic labour laws. 
 
The implementation of these agreements, and the extent to which the 
mechanisms described above have been used, shall be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.4. – European Union Free Trade Agreements 
 
3.4.1. – Introduction 
 
In general, the forms of “social clauses” contained within Free Trade Agreements 
concluded by the EU are consistent. In certain circumstances the agreements 
only allow for cooperation and dialogue between the parties on issues relating to 
fundamental labour rights.133 However, certain other agreements have specific 
mechanisms to ensure parties fulfil specific obligations relating to these 
                                                        
133 For example. European Community-Chile, Association Agreement, (18 November 2002), 
(hereinafter “EU-Chile, Association Agreement, (2002)”) and European Community-South Africa, 
Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement, (11 October 1999), (hereinafter “EU-South 
Africa, Cooperation Agreement, (1999)”). Additionally, certain agreements also include 
cooperation and dialogue provisions on sustainable economic and social development. Such 
agreements do not include specific references to labour issues, but such issues could fall within 
the scope of such provisions. See, Title III, EU-Palestinian Authority, Interim Association 
Agreement, (24 February 1997); Title V, EU-Morocco, Association Agreement, (26 February 
1996); Title VI, EU-Israel, Association Agreement, (20 November 1995); Title V, EU-Algeria, 
Association Agreement, (22 April 2002); and Title V, EU-Cameroon, Economic Partnership 
Agreement, (15 January 2009). 
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fundamental labour rights. 
 
3.4.2. – Obligations and Implementation Procedures 
 
Certain agreements oblige the parties to fully implement laws that uphold the 
fundamental labour rights as outlined in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, 1998 (hereinafter “ILO 1998 Declaration”).134 In 
addition to this, a common feature of Free Trade Agreements that the EU is party 
to are provisions that prohibit “social-dumping”.135 Such obligations are general 
contained in specific chapters that relate to “Trade and Sustainable 
Development”. In the event that a Party fails to fulfil their obligations that relate 
to labour issues the agreements generally set up mechanisms to allow Parties to 
raise concerns. The agreements, excluding those concluded with Chile and South 
Africa,136 highlight inter-Governmental consultations as the primary method for 
rectifying any issues.137 Following this, the agreements generally allow for the 
issues to be passed on to specific Committee established under the agreement 
that are mandated to deal with trade and sustainable development issues.138 If 
the issue is not remedied by this point then the Party that initially made the 
request has the ability to request a panel of three experts, chosen by the 
signatories, to be convened to consider this issue.139 Following a period which 
affords the panel the opportunity to request information from the parties, 
interested bodies, and international organisations, a report containing 
                                                        
134 For example, Article 269(3), European Union, Colombia, and Peru, Trade Agreement, (June 
2012), (hereinafter “EU-Colombia and Peru, Trade Agreement, (2012)”); Article 286(2), EU-
Central America, Association Agreement, (29 June 2012), (hereinafter “EU-CA, Association 
Agreement, (2012)”); and, EU-Georgia, Association Agreement, (16 June 2014), (hereinafter “EU-
Georgia, Association Agreement, (2014)”), Article 269(2). 
135 For example, Article 193, EU-CARIFORUM, Economic Partnership Agreement, (20 October 
2008), (hereinafter “EU-CARIFORUM, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2008)”); Chapter 13, 
Article 7, EU-Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (6 October 2010), (hereinafter “EU-Korea, Free Trade 
Agreement, (2010)”); and, Article 371(2), EU-Moldova, Association Agreement” (27 June 2014). 
136 Such agreements only include aspirations relating to cooperation and no obligations relating 
to implementation, social dumping, or any other issues. 
137 For example, Article 242(2) and (3), EU-Georgia, Association Agreement, (2014); Article 
195(4), EU-CARIFORUM, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2008); and, Chapter 13, Article 
14(1), EU-Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (2010). 
138 For example, Article 242(4), EU-Georgia, Association Agreement, (2014); and, Chapter 13, 
Article 14(3), EU-Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (2010). 
139 For example, Article 243(1), EU-Georgia, Association Agreement, (2014); Article 195(5), EU-
CARIFORUM, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2008); and, Chapter 13, Article 15(1), EU-
Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (2010). 
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recommendations to ensure compliance is published. The Parties then adopt a 
mutually agreeable action plan relating to these non-binding recommendations 
and the Committee then oversees implementation of them.140 In the majority of 
the agreements concluded by the EU there are no further enforcement 
mechanisms available, such as monetary compensation or restriction of trade 
benefits.141 However, if an issue of implementation is not resolved under the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA then recourse to the general dispute settlement system is 
available. 
 
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA, in a departure from the approach taken in previous 
agreements, allows the parties to continue with either mediation 142  or 
arbitration143 in the event that Governmental consultations or the expert panel 
has not resolved the issue.144 The arbitral panel, which must include labour 
experts,145 produces a report on the issue. If this report, and recommendations, 
are not complied with then the aggrieved Party can take “appropriate measures”. 
However, the agreement explicitly prohibits the suspension of trade concessions 
if the issue relates to non-compliance with labour rights obligations. It has been 
suggested that “appropriate measures” could therefore relate to cooperative 
activities between the parties146 due to the need for any “appropriate measures” 
to have the aim of promoting compliance.147 
 
3.4.3. – Cooperative Activities and Civil Society Dialogue 
 
Cooperative activities amongst Parties are provided for in a number of 
                                                        
140 For example, Article 243(8), EU-Georgia, Association Agreement, (2014); Article 195(6), EU-
CARIFORUM, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2008); and, Chapter 13, Article 15(2), EU-
Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (2010). 
141 Recourse to the general dispute settlement procedure is expressly prohibited in the majority 
of agreements, see  Article 242(1), EU-Georgia, Association Agreement, (2014); Article 285(5), 
EU-Colombia and Peru, Trade Agreement, (2012); and, Article 284(4), EU-CA, Association 
Agreement, (2012). 
142 Article 205, EU-CARIFORUM, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2008). 
143 Article 206(1), EU-CARIFORUM, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2008). 
144 Article 204(6), EU-CARIFORUM, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2008). 
145 Article 207(4), EU-CARIFORUM, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2008). 
146 Ebert, F. C. and Posthuma, A., “Labour provisions in trade arrangements: current trends and 
perspectives”, (2011), International Institute for Labour Studies, page 15. 
147 Article 213(2), -CARIFORUM, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2008). 
35 
 
agreements concluded by the EU. As mentioned above, some agreements only 
provide for such activities.148 Such cooperative activities are underpinned by 
recognition that economic development must be accompanied by social 
progress.149 The EU-South Africa Agreement also establishes a cooperative 
council that is charged with overseeing the functioning of the agreement and 
exchanging information relating to cooperative activities in relation to 
protection of labour rights.150 This dialogue on such issues, and the importance 
of civil society’s input, is expressly emphasised within the EU-Korea FTA. This 
agreement established Domestic Advisory Groups that include representatives 
from labour, environmental, and business organisations in order to provide 
information on the implementation of the provisions relating to sustainable 
development to the Parties.151 These opinions can be used by the Parties as 
justification to enter into cooperative consultations.152 The importance of the 
Domestic Advisory Groups in this process will be fully explored below.153 
 
3.4.4. – Conclusion 
 
As can be seen, the mechanisms relating to fundamental labour right obligations 
place a heavy emphasis on Parties collaborating to achieve compliance, as 
opposed to compelling this through potential fines. Despite the EU-CARIFORUM 
EPA including the availability of stronger enforcement proceedings under the 
general dispute settlement regime, the ability to impose trade sanctions is 
explicitly prohibited in relation to labour rights issues. This position contrasts 
with the U.S. agreements discussed above where restriction of trade benefits can 
be imposed under almost all of the agreements in relation to labour rights issues.  
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA in design is most comparable with the agreements 
concluded between the U.S. and Colombia, Korea, Panama, and Peru. This is due 
                                                        
148 EU-Chile, Association Agreement, (2002), and EU-South Africa, Cooperation Agreement, 
(1999), see footnote 132. 
149 Article 86, EU-South Africa, Cooperation Agreement, (1999). 
150 Article 97. EU-South Africa, Cooperation Agreement, (1999). “Labour rights” within the 
agreement include freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, and the prohibition 
of forced labour, child labour, and discrimination in the workplace, see Article 86, EU-South 
Africa, Cooperation Agreement, (1999). 
151 Chapter 13, Article 12(4), EU-Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (2010). 
152 Chapter 13, Article 14(1), EU-Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (2010). 
153 Chapter 4.3.4. 
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to the fact all issues of non-compliance can proceed to consideration by a Panel 
as opposed to such procedures being restricted to non-implementation of 
domestic labour laws as is the case under the other U.S. agreements.  
 
Collaboration between Parties is a theme that runs throughout the entirety of 
Free Trade Agreements concluded by the EU. A number of agreements 
specifically allow for cooperation between parties in order to ensure, or bring 
about, compliance with fundamental labour rights stemming from the ILO 1998 
Declaration or general labour rights issues. Additionally, the EU-Korea FTA goes 
further in establishing bodies to ensure the opinion of civil society is considered 
and acted upon. The extent to which these mechanisms have been fulfilled and 
utilised in practice shall be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.5. – Canadian Free Trade Agreements 
 
The following shall be a discussion of the provisions contained within Free Trade 
Agreements that have been concluded by Canada since the adoption of the 
NAFTA and NAALC. The provisions of the agreement concluded with Chile are of 
significant difference to systems contained in other Canadian agreements and 
are therefore worthy of separate consideration. Following this, the procedures 
within other Canadian agreements shall be considered. 
 
3.5.1. – Chile 
 
The Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, concluded on 6 February 1997, was 
accompanied by two side agreements on environmental and labour issues. As a 
result of the desire for Chile to accede to the NAALC the mechanisms within the 
Canada-Chile Agreement on Labour Cooperation was closely modelled on the 
NAALC. 154  The agreement obliges the Parties to promote eleven labour 
principles that are intended to protect workers. Such eleven principles are 
                                                        
154 “Desiring to facilitate the accession of Chile to the North American Agreement on Labour 
Cooperation” - Preamble to Canada-Chile, Agreement on Labour Cooperation, (6 February 1997), 
(hereinafter “Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997)”).  
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identical to those contained within the NAALC.155 With regards to domestic 
labour law, covering these eleven principles, the Parties are again, in keeping 
with the non-invasive nature of the NAALC system, only required to implement 
existing domestic law relating to the relevant labour principles.  
 
The agreement establishes a number of bodies that assist with the 
administrative and dispute settlement mechanisms contained within the 
agreement, including the Canada-Chile Commission for Labour Cooperation that 
consists of a Ministerial Council and National Secretariats located within both 
Canada and Chile.156 The Council oversees the implementation of the agreement 
whilst establishing priorities for the cooperative activities carried out by the 
Parties relating to a number of labour principles covered by the agreement 
through seminars, conferences, and research projects. 157  The National 
Secretariats act as a contact point for each Party to the agreements and are 
intended to provide publicly available information if requested by the Ministerial 
Council, the Secretariat of the other Party, or by the Evaluation Committee of 
Experts; a body involved in the dispute settlement mechanism established by the 
agreement. The National Secretariats also receive public communications on 
labour law issues within their territory that have to be dealt with in accordance 
with domestic legislation and procedures.158 These Secretariats act in a very 
similar manner to the NAOs set up under the NAALC. 
 
Any issues under the agreement are initially intended to be dealt with via 
Ministerial Consultations.159 If this is not sufficient then the issue is passed on to 
the Evaluation Committee of Experts if it is trade related160 and concerns 
occupational safety and health or another technical labour standard.161 The three 
                                                        
155 See footnote 74. 
156 Article 8, Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997).  
157 Articles 10 and 11, Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997). 
158 Article 14(3), Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997). 
159 Article 20, Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997). 
160 Article 21(3), Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997). 
161 Article 21(2), Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997).  “Technical labour standards” defined 
as laws and regulations directly related to the prohibition of forced labour, labour protections for 
children and young persons, minimum employment standards, elimination of employment 
discrimination, equal pay for men and women, prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, 
compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses, and protection of migrant workers, 
38 
 
independent experts that make up the Committee then consider information 
from the National Secretariats, public individuals and organisations and other 
interested interlocutors in order to produce a report on the issue.162 The Parties 
to the agreement then provide comments on the report that the Committee are 
obliged to take into consideration before finalising the report.163 Following this, 
if the issue relates to occupational safety and health, child labour, or minimum 
wage standards, then a special session of the Ministerial Council can be 
requested if the Panel report found a persistent pattern of failure to implement 
the relevant domestic laws to have occurred.164 An important caveat to this is 
that a State will not be considered to have failed to apply its labour laws if the 
action/inaction of the authorities was as a result of a reasonable exercise of 
discretion or a bona fide legitimate allocation of resources to enforcement of 
other labour laws.165 If this special Ministerial Council session does not resolve 
the issue then an Arbitral Panel can be established in order to provide a further 
report on the issue, again, only if it relates to occupational safety and health, 
child labour, or minimum wage provisions.166 The final step of the procedure, in 
the event that this report and recommendations of the Panel are not enforced, is 
the ability of the panel to impose an annual monetary assessment of up to $10 
million (U.S.) against a Party that will be used to improve labour law 
enforcement in the relevant territory.167  
 
In general, the mechanisms in the Canada-Chile Agreement on Labour 
Cooperation are very similar to that contained in the NAALC. However, the other 
agreements concluded by Canada depart from the NAALC model. 
 
3.5.2. – Other Agreements 
 
The six other side agreements relating to labour cooperation concluded by 
                                                                                                                                                              
see Article 44, Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997). 
162 Articles 22 and 23, Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997). 
163Article 23(2), Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997). 
164 Article 25(1), Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997). 
165 Article 44, “Definitions”, Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997). 
166 Article 26(1), Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997). 
167 Annex 35(1) and (3), Canada-Chile, Labour Agreement, (1997). 
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Canada are all very similar in design, scope, and the mechanisms included. The 
most recent free trade agreement concluded by Canada, with Korea, includes a 
specific chapter on labour issues as opposed to including such provision within a 
side agreement. The procedure, however, is the same as contained within the 
side agreements outlined below. 
 
In general, the agreements cover the four fundamental rights contained within 
the ILO’s 1998 Declaration as well as certain rights that are part of the ILO’s 
Decent Work Agenda.168  These cooperation agreements all establish both 
Ministerial Councils, which consist of labour ministers from the two parties, and 
national bodies that act as contact points and receive public communications on 
labour law issues within the territory of the other Party.169 Generally, under the 
agreements the Parties are obliged to ensure that the above rights are protected 
via domestic legislation, to implement these domestic laws, and to not reduce 
such protections in order to encourage trade or investment, thus protecting 
against “social dumping”.170 
 
The procedure for dealing with instances of non-compliance with obligations is 
consistent throughout the agreements concluded by Canada. Initially, it is the 
intention that issues will be resolved through Ministerial Consultations.171 If this 
is not successful, and the issue relates to persistent non-implementation of 
domestic labour laws, or undertaking “social dumping” that impacts upon any of 
                                                        
168 For example, Article 1(1), Canada-Jordan, Agreement on Labour Cooperation, (28 June 2009), 
(hereinafter “Canada-Jordan, Labour Agreement, (2009)”); Article 1(1), Canada-Peru, Agreement 
on Labour Cooperation, (29 May 2008), (hereinafter “Canada-Peru, Labour Agreement, (2008)”); 
Chapter 18, Article 2, Canada-Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (11 March 2014), (hereinafter 
“Canada-Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (2014)”). 
169 For example, Articles 7 and 9, Canada-Jordan, Labour Agreement, (2009); Articles 7, 8, and 10, 
Canada-Peru, Labour Agreement, (2008); and, Chapter 18, Articles 8-10, Canada-Korea, Free 
Trade Agreement, (2014). 
170 Article 2, Canada-Colombia, Agreement on Labour Cooperation, (21 November 2008), 
(hereinafter “Canada-Colombia, Labour Agreement, (2008)”); Article 2(1), Canada-Honduras, 
Agreement on Labour Cooperation, (5 November 2013), (hereinafter “Canada-Honduras, Labour 
Agreement, (2013)”); and, Article 2, Canada-Panama, Agreement on Labour Cooperation, (14 
May 2010), (hereinafter “Canada-Panama, Labour Agreement, (2010)”). Within the Canada-Costa 
Rica, Agreement on Labour Cooperation, (April 2001), (hereinafter “Canada-Costa Rica, Labour 
Agreement, (2001)”), the only obligations relate to effective enforcement of domestic labour 
legislation. 
171  For example, Article 11, Canada-Jordan, Labour Agreement, (2009); Article 12, Canada-Peru, 
Labour Agreement, (2008); Chapter 18, Article 13, Canada-Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (2014). 
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the fundamental labour rights contained within the ILO’s 1998 Declaration, then 
further procedures are available.172 However, if the issue falls outwith this scope, 
or is not trade related, then no further steps can be taken to rectify non-
compliance. This contrasts with the NAALC model, and the Canada-Chile 
Agreement on Labour Cooperation, where procedures are limited to specific 
labour rights.  
 
The further procedures include the convening of a Review Panel, consisting of 
three independent experts, to investigate and report upon the issue. Following 
this initial report, the Parties have the opportunity to provide comments before 
the publication of final report. If the Review Panel finds that there has been a 
pattern of failure to apply domestic labour laws, or “social dumping” that 
impacts upon fundamental labour rights, then the Parties are invited to mutually 
agree upon an action plan to address this.173 If this action plan is not agreed 
upon, or not implemented following agreement, then a monetary fine can be 
imposed upon the offending party.174 In certain circumstances there are limits 
imposed upon the maximum value of any fine.175 The money paid by the 
offending Party is generally used to improve the situation with regards to 
implementation of labour laws in their territory.176   
 
In addition to this dispute settlement procedure for non-implementation of 
                                                        
172 Article 13, Canada-Colombia, Labour Agreement, (2008); Article 13(1), Canada-Honduras, 
Labour Agreement, (2013); Article 12(1), Canada-Jordan, Labour Agreement, (2009); Article 
13(1), Canada-Panama, Labour Agreement, (2010); and, Article 13, Canada-Peru, Labour 
Agreement, (2008). 
173 Article 19, Canada-Colombia, Labour Agreement, (2008); Article 14(5), Canada-Honduras, 
Labour Agreement, (2013); Article 13(6), Canada-Jordan, Labour Agreement, (2009); Article 
14(5), Canada-Panama, Labour Agreement, (2010); and, Article 19, Canada-Peru, Labour 
Agreement, (2008).  
174 The ability to impose monetary fines does not exist under the Canada-Costa Rica, Labour 
Agreement, (2001). For examples of such provisions see Article 20, Canada-Colombia, Labour 
Agreement, (2008); Article 14(6), Canada-Honduras, Labour Agreement, (2013); Article 14(6), 
Canada-Panama, Labour Agreement, (2010); and, Article 20, Canada-Peru, Labour Agreement, 
(2008). 
175 Annex 4, Article 1, Canada-Colombia, Labour Agreement, (2008); Appendix 3, Article 2(b), 
Canada-Panama, Labour Agreement, (2010); and, Annex 4, Article 1, Canada-Peru, Labour 
Agreement, (2008). 
176 Article 20(5), Canada-Colombia, Labour Agreement, (2008); Annex 3, Article 3, Canada-
Honduras, Labour Agreement, (2013); Annex 4, Article 3, Canada-Jordan, Labour Agreement, 
(2009); Appendix 3, Article 3, Canada-Panama, Labour Agreement, (2010); Article 20(5), Canada-
Peru, Labour Agreement, (2008); and, Annex 18-E, Article 3, Canada-Korea, Free Trade 
Agreement, (2014). 
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domestic law, a number of the agreements also oblige the parties to undertake 
cooperative activities to improve the situation with regards to respect for labour 
standards in the respective territories of the Parties.177 Potential areas for 
cooperation include effective application of fundamental labour rights, labour 
administration and inspection systems, gender issues, and any other matters as 
the Parties agree.178 Such cooperative activities can encompass exchange of 
information, specialists, and the organisation of joint seminars and 
conferences.179 
 
3.6. – Other Agreements 
 
3.6.1. – Bilateral Agreements 
 
As can be seen in Annex 1 there are a number of bilateral Free Trade Agreements 
that include labour protections that fall outwith the above country specific 
categories. In recent years, Chile has concluded a number of trade agreements 
with developing countries. All of these agreements include promotional, as 
opposed to conditional, provisions, and only those concluded with Panama and 
Colombia include recourse to a consultative body in the event of 
disagreements.180 Additionally, a group of three trade agreements include labour 
rights obligations within the text of the agreement.181 The Japan-Philippines and 
Japan-Switzerland agreements include obligations preventing “social-dumping” 
                                                        
177 Article 9, Canada-Colombia, Labour Agreement, (2008); Article 9, Canada-Honduras, Labour 
Agreement, (2013); Article 8, Canada-Jordan, Labour Agreement, (2009); Article 9, Canada-
Panama, Labour Agreement, (2010); Article 20(5), Canada-Peru, Labour Agreement, (2008); and, 
Article 11, Canada-Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (2014). 
178 Annex 1, Canada-Colombia, Labour Agreement, (2008); Annex 1, Canada-Honduras, Labour 
Agreement, (2013); Annex 1, Canada-Jordan, Labour Agreement, (2009); Appendix 1, Canada-
Panama, Labour Agreement, (2010); Annex 1, Canada-Peru, Labour Agreement, (2008); and, 
Annex 18-A, Article 3, Canada-Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (2014). 
179 Article 9(3), Canada-Colombia, Labour Agreement, (2008); Article 9(2), Canada-Honduras, 
Labour Agreement, (2013); Article 8(2), Canada-Jordan, Labour Agreement, (2009); Article 9(2), 
Canada-Panama, Labour Agreement, (2010); Article 9(3), Canada-Peru, Labour Agreement, 
(2008); and, Annex 18-A, Article 2, Canada-Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (2014). 
180 Chile-Panama, Free Trade Agreement, (27 June 2006) and Chile-Peru, Free Trade Agreement, 
(22 August 2006). 
181 Japan-Philippines, Economic Partnership Agreement, (9 September 2006), (hereinafter 
“Japan-Philippines, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2006)”); Japan-Switzerland, Free Trade 
and Economic Partnership Agreement, (19 February 2009), (hereinafter “Japan-Switzerland, 
Free Trade Agreement, (2009)”); and, Taiwan-Nicaragua, Free Trade Agreement, (16 June 2006), 
(hereinafter “Taiwan-Nicaragua, Free Trade Agreement, (2006)”). 
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in order to attract investment,182 whilst the Chinese Taipei-Nicaragua agreement 
also includes the need to establish, and implement, minimum labour standards at 
a domestic level.183 All of these agreements afford access to the regular dispute 
settlement procedures in the event of non-compliance with the above mentioned 
obligations; this can eventually lead to trade sanctions. 184 
 
3.6.2. – Regional Agreements 
 
Six regional trade agreements incorporate social clauses.185 Such clauses take a 
purely promotional form, and so no sanctions can be imposed as a result of 
failing to meet standards. The three agreements concluded by African States 
include cooperative activities relating to a number of labour issues, including 
gender equality and working conditions, but make no reference to any ILO 
international standards. 
 
Of the three agreements amongst Latin American and Caribbean States, the 
relevant MERCOSUR and CARICOM Labour Agreements include commitments to 
meet minimum labour standards relating to rights contained within the ILO 
1998 Declaration.186 However, the specific agreement relating to labour issues 
under the Andean Community’s OSH Agreement only covers Occupational Health 
and Safety. These agreements also include implementation mechanisms, 
including technical assistance and cooperation from bodies established under 
the agreements, as well as monitoring of progress towards achieving certain 
                                                        
182 Article 103, Japan-Philippines, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2006) and Article 101, 
Japan-Switzerland, Free Trade Agreement, (2009). 
183 Chapter 18, Taiwan-Nicaragua, Free Trade Agreement, (2006). 
184 Article 157, Japan-Philippines, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2006); Article 145 Japan-
Switzerland, Free Trade Agreement, (2009); and, Chapter 22, Article 16, Taiwan-Nicaragua, Free 
Trade Agreement, (2006). 
185 Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), (1993); Agreement 
Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), (1994); Treaty for 
the Establishment of the East African Community (EAC), (2000); Caribbean Community, 
“Declaration of Labour and Industrial Relations Principles”, (1998); Andean Community, 
“Instrument on Occupational Safety and Health”, (1998, amended in 2004); MERCOSUR, “Social-
Labour Declaration”, (1998). 
186 Agreements only available in Spanish. See overview in Ebert, F. C. and Posthuma, A., “Labour 
provisions in trade arrangements: current trends and perspectives”, (2011), International Institute 
for Labour Studies, page 19.  
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standards.187 
 
3.7. – Conclusion 
 
As can be seen from the discussion above, the general framework for 
enforcement of obligations relating to labour rights within various agreements 
have certain similarities and differences. Most systems encourage public 
communications on issues, followed by cooperative consultations, an 
independent panel report. The procedures under agreements concluded by the 
U.S. and Canada can result in the imposition of monetary compensation or 
restriction of trade benefits. The EU agreements, however, focus on cooperation 
in order to ensure implementation of the panel report and no hard mechanisms 
for enforcement exist. However, the one agreement that affords further 
enforcement proceedings, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, specifically excludes the 
imposition of trade restriction for non-compliance with labour rights obligations. 
 
The main differences in the systems relate to the level of protection afforded to 
specific rights. Within the NAALC, only issues concerning a small group of rights 
can proceed to the final stage of enforcement. This approach is mirrored in the 
Canada-Chile Agreement on Labour Cooperation. Under other agreements 
concluded by the United States, all instances of non-compliance with certain 
labour obligations can eventually be implemented via a restriction of trade 
benefits. The agreements concluded by Canada, with the exception of the 
Canada-Chile Agreement on Labour Cooperation, also afford the ability to 
restrict trade for failure to implement domestic labour laws or “social-dumping” 
in relation to all the rights contained within the ILO 1998 Declaration. 
 
One common feature of these agreements and systems is the provisions relating 
to cooperative activities. Although some agreements specify the issues and 
activities that should be carried out, all agreements recognise the benefits that 
increased cooperation can have upon respect for labour standards within the 
various territories. 
                                                        
187 Ibid., page 18. 
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Despite failed attempts to formalise a link between trade and labour at an 
international level, as discussed above, there has been a multitude of bilateral 
and multilateral trade agreements concluded that include “social clauses”. At an 
international level, concern relating to the potentially protectionist results from 
inclusion of worker rights within the GATT dispute settlement regime, or 
potentially within the WTO regime, resulted in attempts to do so being rejected. 
At a bilateral or regional level, protections exist, such as the general need for 
non-compliance with labour obligations to impact upon trade, before the dispute 
settlement procedures can be utilised. Additionally, States may feel they have 
greater control over treatment of such issues under these mutually agreed 
regimes as opposed to at a potentially unpredictable multilateral, international 
level where political interference can amend obligations without the consent of 
all Parties. Under the Free Trade Agreements discussed above there are 
thorough reporting and investigative procedures before potential trade 
sanctions can be imposed. These procedures, again, are generally separated from 
the wider pool of political considerations that may have influenced proceedings 
at an international level. Also, in contrast to the vague proposals presented to the 
GATT and WTO, trade sanctions can only be imposed in very limited, and clearly 
defined, instances under the Free Trade Agreements discussed above. 
 
The above has fully set out the mechanisms that exist for enforcement of labour 
obligations that exist in various Free Trade Agreements. However, it is important 
to examine to what extent these mechanisms are in fact utilised and 
implemented in reality.  
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Chapter 4 – Implementation of Free Trade Agreements 
 
4.1. – Introduction 
 
The above has fully set out the phenomena of social clauses that protect labour 
rights within a variety Free Trade Agreements. Whilst these protections, and 
mechanisms to enforce, may exist within the text of agreements, practical effect 
can only be given through action by the Parties.  
 
The following shall be a discussion of instances of implementation of the 
mechanisms for protection of labour rights within the agreements discussed 
above. In certain cases there have been no steps towards fulfilling the obligations 
within the agreements or utilisation of the available procedures relating to 
review of compliance by the parties. This Chapter shall focus on the extent to 
which procedures under the agreements have been exhausted and shall not 
enter into consideration of whether this has subsequently lead to practical 
improvements with regards to the labour rights concerned.  
 
4.2. – United States Free Trade Agreements 
 
 4.2.1. – Introduction 
 
The majority of U.S. Free Trade Agreements oblige the parties to establish 
domestic bodies to consider public communications on issues relating to 
implementation of labour obligations within the agreement. Submissions under 
the agreement to the U.S. are received by the Office of Trade and Labour Affairs 
(hereinafter “OTLA”). As discussed above, following consideration of these 
submissions, a Party may request cooperative consultation with the other Party. 
In relation to a number of specific situations, the issue can further proceed to 
consideration by an independent panel. 
 
The following shall be a discussion of a number of these submissions that have 
been received by the OTLA and the subsequent steps taken under the procedures 
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that have been outlined above. Not all of the following case studies have been 
concluded. However, a discussion of the steps taken thus far have been included 
to provide a full picture as to the extent to which the labour rights protections 
within the agreements have been implemented. 
 
4.2.2. – North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
 
The NAALC, a side agreement to the NAFTA, was the first multi-lateral trade 
agreement to include labour rights protection mechanisms. Since the adoption of 
the agreement in 1993 there have been a number of submissions made that 
allege failures to comply with obligations under the agreement. In total, 38 
submissions have been made to the NAOs situated in the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico. The content of such submissions shall not be set out in full. 
However, a consideration of the trends in what rights are the subject of these 
submissions, and any action taken, shall be undertaken. An overview of the 
submissions made in relation to the NAALC is included in Annex 3. 
 
As set out above, the NAOs receive communications on labour law matters that 
arise in the territory of another contracting party.188 The U.S. NAO has received 
22 out of the 38 submissions made under the NAALC, with Canada receiving six, 
and the Mexican NAO receiving the remaining ten. All of the submissions 
received by the Mexican NAO have been directed against the U.S., whilst of the 22 
received by the U.S. NAO, all but two relate to compliance by Mexico. 
 
Following receipt of these submissions the NAO will either decline the issue for 
review, or produce a report on the issue. Submissions can be declined or review 
if further consideration would not further the objectives of the NAALC, or as a 
result of procedural issues. Following a substantive report, as discussed above, it 
is common practice for the relevant parties to conclude a “ministerial 
declaration/agreement” in order to rectify any identified shortcomings. Of the 38 
submissions, nine have been declined for review, whilst 22 have been 
                                                        
188 NAALC, (1993), Article 16(3). 
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accepted.189 Three of the remaining reports are currently under consideration, 
whilst in four cases the submission was withdrawn by the submitters. In 
examining the content of these submissions, only the 22 submissions that have 
been accepted for review will be considered. 
 
As set out above, the labour principles within the NAALC are effectively split in to 
three groups as a result of different implementation mechanisms being available 
depending on the issues concerned. As discussed above, submissions relating to 
any issues can be subject to review by the NAO and a ministerial agreement. If 
the issue relates to a Group Two or Three issue, then the submissions can be 
examined by the ECE. Only in the event that the issue falls within Group Three, 
and concerns a persistent pattern of failure to implement domestic labour law, 
can the submissions proceed to an Arbitral Panel. Of the 22 submissions that 
have resulted in reports from the receiving NAO, fourteen have resulted in the 
conclusion of a ministerial agreement. Seventeen of these 22 submissions 
included Group Two issues and fifteen included Group Three issues. However, 
none of the eligible submissions have ever moved beyond ministerial 
consultations to review by the ECE or an Arbitral Panel.  
 
Within the ministerial agreements concluded, the States generally agree to 
undertake a number of capacity building and awareness raising activities. This 
can include activities such as workshops, outreach programmes, and 
international conferences on the issues raised within the original submission.190 
These activities are comparable to the cooperative activities outlined in other 
U.S.191 and EU192 trade agreements. 
 
                                                        
189 See Annex 3 for an overview of all NAALC Submissions. 
190 Compa, L., “Chapter 6 – A Glass Half Full: The NAFTA Labor Agreement and Cross-Border Labor 
Action”, pages 144, 151, and 153 in Andreopoulos, G. J. (ed.), “Concepts and Strategies in 
International Human Rights Law”, (2002). For example, Office of Trade and Labor Affairs, 
“Ministerial Consultations – Submission 9501 (Sprint Case) Agreement on Implementation”, (13 
February 1996), and Office of Trade and Labor Affairs, “Ministerial Consultations – Mexico 
Submissions 9801, 9802 and 9803”, (18 May 2000).  
191 Chapter 3.3.3. above. 
192 Chapter 3.4.3. above. 
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4.2.3. – DR-CAFTA – Guatemala 
 
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organisations 
(hereinafter “AFL-CIO”), with the support of six local trade unions,193 made a 
submission to the OTLA on 23 April 2008 that covered labour issues in 
Guatemala.194 The submission alleged continued failure to “respect, promote and 
realize” core workers’ rights contained within the ILO Declaration 1998.195 The 
petitioners stated that their cases showed a recurring course of action, or 
inaction, which impacted upon trade with the U.S. due to the fact that the 
workers and companies involved exported a number of goods to the United 
States.196 The information contained within the submission included issues 
relating to failure to protect the right to collective bargaining, the unlawful 
dismissal of trade union members, the blacklisting of union officials and 
members, and also the failure to protect such individuals from violence.197 The 
actions, or inactions, of the Guatemalan authorities violated a number of 
provisions of the domestic Labour Code, the Constitution, and international 
agreements protecting workers’ rights. Some issues within the submission had 
been raised within the ILO. The subsequent recommendations made to 
Guatemala on order to rectify the deficiencies were largely ignored.198 The ILO 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
had also commented on the repeated failure by Guatemala to take action in order 
to fully implement ILO Conventions.199 This submission was accepted for review 
                                                        
193 The trade unions were STEPQ (Union of Port Quetzal Company Workers), SITRABI (Union of 
Izabal Banana Workers), SITRAINPROSCA (an enterprise level union in the fruit and vegetable 
sector), the Coalition of Avandia Workers, SITRAFRIBO (a trade union representing workers in a 
garment production company), and FESTRAS (Federation of Food and Similar Industries 
Workers of Guatemala). 
194 AFL-CIO et al., “Public Submission to the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) under 
Chapters 16 (Labor) and 20 (Dispute Settlement) of the Dominican Republic – Central America Free 
Trade Agreement Concerning the Failure of the Government of Guatemala to Effectively Enforce its 
Labor Laws and Comply with its Commitments Under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work”, (23 April 2008), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/GuatemalaSub.pdf, (last accessed 24 April 2015), 
(hereinafter “AFL-CIO, “Guatemala Submission”, (2008)”). 
195 AFL-CIO, “Guatemala Submission”, (2008), page 2. 
196 AFL-CIO, “Guatemala Submission”, (2008), page 3. 
197 See AFL-CIO, “Guatemala Submission”, (2008), pages 2 and 3 for a summary of the submission. 
198 Committee on the Freedom of Association, ILO, “Case No 2540 (Guatemala)”, Report 354, (June 
2009). 
199 AFL-CIO, “Guatemala Submission”, (2008), page 22. See also Committee on the Application of 
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on 12 June 2008 by the OTLA.200  
 
The review process by the OTLA resulted in a public report on 16 January 
2009.201 This report was completed following two fact-finding missions to 
Guatemala and the consideration of information received from various parties. 
The report noted the willingness of the Guatemalan authorities, including 
President Colom, to cooperate with the U.S. investigation.202 The review of the 
submission noted the inefficiency of the inspection system, the failure to enforce 
court orders relating to labour law violations, and issues relating to the 
investigation of instances of violence against trade union members. Despite 
making a number of recommendations that should be followed to ensure 
compliance, the report did not recommend the initiation of cooperative 
consultations at a ministerial level between the parties.203 The OTLA felt that the 
cooperation of Guatemala was sufficient to suggest that the issues would be 
resolved without recourse to such proceedings. However, the implementation of 
the recommendations would be reviewed in six months to assess whether the 
situation had changed.204  
 
As a result of the continued failure to enforce internationally recognised labour 
rights, the U.S. authorities eventually requested cooperative consultations under 
the DR-CAFTA on 30 July 2010.205 The request highlighted the recurring failure 
of authorities to investigate labour law violations and take enforcement action in 
the event that such violations were established, and the failure to enforce court 
                                                                                                                                                              
Standards, ILO, “Observation on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (No. 87) – Guatemala”, (2008), International Labour Conference, 97th session 
and Committee on the Application of Standards, ILO, “Observation on Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) – Guatemala”, (2007), International Labour 
Conference, 96th session. 
200 Office of Trade and Labor Affairs, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Public Report of 
Review of Office of Trade and Labor Affairs, U.S. Submission 2008-01 (Guatemala)”, (16 January 
2009), (hereinafter “OTLA, “Review Report”, (2009)”), Executive Summary, page i. 
201 OTLA, “Review Report”, (2009). 
202 OTLA, “Review Report”, (2009), Executive Summary, page i. 
203 OTLA, “Review Report”, (2009), page 34. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Letter to Guatemalan Minister of Economy and 
Minister of Labor and Social Protection”, (30 July 2010), available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/morocco/pdfs/073010%20Kirk%20S
olis%20Letter%20to%20Guatemala%20about%20Labor%20Rights%20Violations.pdf, (last 
accessed 24 April 2015). 
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order relating to labour law violations. The deterioration, as opposed to 
improvement, of the situation within Guatemala motivated this decision. Despite 
these consultations the U.S. authorities still felt that steps taken by Guatemala 
were “insufficient” and so a meeting of the Free Trade Commission, established 
under the DR-CAFTA,206 was requested in order to facilitate resolution of the 
issue through the adoption of an action plan. Such an action plan was not 
forthcoming and so the U.S. Trade Representative (hereinafter “USTR”) took the 
unprecedented step of requesting the formation of an arbitral panel.207 The 
arbitral panel, prior to the start of proceedings, was suspended in order to offer 
parties the opportunity to adopt a mutually agreed action plan to ensure 
implementation of workers’ rights in Guatemala. 
 
Contrary to previous attempts, an action plan was adopted by the parties in April 
2013.208 The action plan outlined steps that Guatemala were obliged to take in 
order to resolve the situation. Such steps included the adoption of legislation 
relating to the sanctioning of employers that violated labour laws, the increasing 
of powers and funding of the labour inspectorate, and better enforcement of 
court orders finding violations of labour laws.209 The action plan included a 
number of obligations that coincided with the recommendations of the OTLA in 
their report of 2009. Proceedings of the arbitral panel were suspended for a 
further 12 months, pending review of implementation of the action plan.210 
Following this review, the USTR found that the Guatemalan authorities had taken 
some steps towards enforcement of the action plan, but concerns still existed, 
especially in relation to the failure to develop legislation to sanction employers 
that violated labour rights.211 Accordingly, the arbitral panel proceedings were 
                                                        
206 Chapter 20, Article 5(2), DR-CAFTA, see also Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Letter to 
Guatemalan Minister of Economy”, (16 May 2011), available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Letter%20--
%20FTC%20Request%20%28signed%29%20May%2016%202011.pdf, (last accessed 24 April 
2015). 
207 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Press Release – U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk 
Announces Next Step in Labor Rights Enforcement Case against Guatemala”, (August 2011). 
208 U.S. and Guatemala, “Mutually Agreed Enforcement Action Plan between the Government of the 
United States and the Government of Guatemala”, (April 2013), (hereinafter “U.S. and Guatemala, 
“Action Plan”, (2013)”). 
209 Ibid. 
210 Articles 18(1) and (2), U.S. and Guatemala, “Action Plan”, (2013). 
211 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “”Press Release: United States Proceeds with 
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resumed on 18 September 2014. This decision was taken in order to send a 
“strong message” that the U.S. would “act firmly to ensure effective enforcement 
of labour laws by ... trading partners”.212 Reaction to this decision was generally 
positive. The AFL-CIO, the original submitters, heralded the decision as a step 
towards improving the working conditions of Guatemalan workers and 
achieving justice on behalf of them. Concurrently, members of the U.S. Congress, 
and Thomas Perez, the U.S. Secretary of Labour, emphasised the fact that 
pursuing litigation would help level the playing field between American and 
Guatemalan workers and prevent the former being disadvantaged.213 Currently, 
the proceedings have resulted in written submissions from both parties and 
receipt of submissions from interested third parties.214 
 
4.2.4. – DR-CAFTA – Dominican Republic 
 
A petition, submitted by Father Christopher Hartley,215 was accepted for review 
by the OTLA on 22 February 2012.216 The petition concerned failure to 
implement domestic labour laws within the sugar industry relating to forced and 
child labour, protection from hazardous working conditions, and retaliatory 
dismissal of workers for attempts to organise in trade unions. The petition 
included a number of references to the U.S. Department of State’s Human Rights 
Report for 2010 and audits of the Better Sugar Cane Initiative relating to 
Dominican sugar companies.217 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Labor Enforcement Case Against Guatemala”, (18 September 2014), available at 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2014/September/United-
States-Proceeds-with-Labor-Enforcement-Case-Against-Guatemala, (last accessed 24 April 
2015), (hereinafter “USTR, “Continuation of Arbitral Panel”, (2014)”). 
212 USTR, “Continuation of Arbitral Panel”, (2014). 
213 Ibid. 
214 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, “In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues 
Relating to Obligations under Article 16.2.1(a)of the CAFTA-DR”, available at 
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/labor/bilateral-and-regional-trade-agreements/guatemala-
submission-under-cafta-dr, (last accessed 24 April 2015). 
215 Father Christopher Hartley, “Formal Public Submissions”, (22 December 2011), available at 
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The OTLA published a public report on the petition on 27 September 2013.218 
Having considered evidence provided by the Government and the submitters, 
alongside public submissions, the review concluded that despite the Dominican 
Republic’s strong legal framework for protecting labour rights, there was 
evidence to suggest violations of a number of internationally recognised 
workers’ rights.219 Concerns were raised as to the implementation of laws 
relating to forced labour, occupational safety and health, provision of a minimum 
wage, and the prohibition of child labour. Underpinning instances of violations 
was a defective domestic investigation procedure. 220  The OTLA received 
evidence of fourteen inspections carried out by authorities within the sugar 
industry during the monitoring period. Review of the inspection reports showed 
shortcomings as a result of language barriers that were not addressed, failure to 
interview a sufficient number of workers, and the interviewing of such workers 
being carried out in the presence of their supervisors.221 Additionally, the initial 
inspections were only followed-up in one instance and there was no reaction 
from authorities in situations where labour rights violations had been 
highlighted. The OTLA concluded their report with eleven recommendations to 
be implemented in order to cure the shortcomings that had been identified.222 
Whilst strengthening the enforcement of domestic law in relation to the 
minimum wage, occupational health and safety, and the prohibition of forced and 
child labour was included in the recommendations, the improvement of the 
inspectorate was also heavily recommended. The review did not recommend 
consultations under the DR-CAFTA but the OTLA would continue to engage with 
the Government and review implementation of the recommendations at six 
monthly intervals.223  
 
The first review, published on 4 April 2014, noted the fact that steps had been 
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taken towards implementation of some of the OTLA recommendations.224 The 
Government had stated their intention to raise awareness amongst the 
inspectorate of the Ministry of Labour’s inspection protocols, but many other 
recommendations had been regrettably ignored. This lack of concrete steps 
taken towards practical implementation of the recommendations was mirrored 
in the subsequent review reports of October 2014225 and April 2015.226 
Additionally, the $10 million (U.S.) project initiated by the U.S. Government in 
order to address a number of the issues highlighted in the OTLA review227 was 
discontinued due to a lack of support from the Dominican Government.228 The 
latest statement from the OTLA included a continuation of the monitoring of the 
situation whilst a consideration of appropriate further actions was undertaken. 
Under the DR-CAFTA there is the possibility to engage the dispute settlement 
system for issues regarding continued non-implementation of domestic labour 
laws if the matter impacts trade between the parties,229 but only once the 
cooperative consultations and other specific mechanisms within the labour 
chapter have been exhausted.230 
 
4.2.5. – DR-CAFTA – Honduras 
 
The OTLA, on 26 March 2012, received a petition from the AFL-CIO relating to 
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labour law issues in Honduras.231 The petition, filed in coordination with 26 
Honduran union and civil society organisations, alleged a number of failures by 
the authorities to effectively enforce domestic labour laws. The petition 
highlighted examples from seventeen worksite areas in support of their 
proposition across a number of export related sectors, including manufacturing, 
ports, and agriculture.232 The failure to implement domestic related to a number 
of internationally recognised workers’ rights.  
 
In June 2009 a coup d’état ousted the democratically elected President. The 
resultant caretaker regime undertook a number of anti-union measures 
including the killing, beating and detention of trade union leaders and activists 
for their part in the resistance. During the Presidency of Porfirio Lobo, from 27 
January 2010 onwards, little respect was attached to the rule of law which 
cultivated a climate of impunity. Intimidation towards those exercising their 
labour rights was a common occurrence. The petition highlighted a number of 
such instances, including the violent police repression of striking teachers that 
lead to injuries and fatalities.233  
 
In review of this petition, the OTLA found evidence of violations of labour rights 
in almost all cases identified by the petition. There were serious concerns 
regarding the protection of a number of internationally recognised labour rights 
including the freedom of association, child labour, and forced labour.234 In 
addition to this, the review, based upon detailed research carried out, found 
cross-cutting issues with the adequacy and competence of the inspectorate.235 
The inspectorate had a poor response rate following receipt of notice of labour 
violations and in the event that inspections were called for, access to worksites 
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was often refused and this only lead to sanctions in one out of 33 instances. 
Additionally, in the event that labour violations were uncovered, sanctions were 
not imposed in 90% of the cases involving minimum wages violations. Despite 
the generally negative findings of the report, the willingness of Honduras to 
engage with U.S. authorities was commended. Further to this, the launching of an 
open dialogue between the Government and NGOs and unions was heralded as a 
step forward, but it had not resulted in any measurable systematic improvement 
in relation to the concerns identified.236 
 
As a result of the serious failings in the implementation of domestic labour laws 
the OTLA issued seven core recommendations to the Government of 
Honduras. 237  This included a number aimed at the improvement of the 
inspectorate and their ability to access worksites, investigate, and sanction 
employers that had violated the relevant labour laws. Recommendations were 
also aimed at improving the enforcement of domestic laws protecting the 
freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the prohibition of child labour. 
The OTLA also recommended the instigation of cooperative consultation 
between the contact points and a meeting of the Labour Affairs Council 
established under the DR-CAFTA.238 The OTLA set out their intention to continue 
to engage with the willing Honduran Government in order to fully implement 
these recommendations. Following the publication of the report a joint 
statement was made by U.S. and Honduran authorities that reinforced their 
pledge to work together to implement the findings.239 A $7 million (U.S.) 
cooperative agreement was made to combat child labour and other labour rights 
issues within Honduras by focussing on building the capacity of the Honduran 
Government to identify and remediate any violations of domestic labour laws. 
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The report also included a review mechanism. Within twelve months of the 
publication the steps taken by Honduras to implement the recommendations 
would be undertaken in order to assess whether further consultations available 
under the DR-CAFTA should be utilised.240 
 
4.2.6. – Bahrain 
 
In February 2011, following continued discontent within civil society as to the 
lack of decent work, basic social services, and adequate housing, a peaceful mass 
pro-democracy protest took place in Bahrain. Over the following days the protest 
grew to include thousands of individuals. In response to this, the riot police 
engaged protesters on 17 February 2011 and, as a result, hundreds of individuals 
were injured and many were killed following the use of tear gas, batons, and live 
ammunition.  Despite this, the unrest continued. On 14 March, troops from Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates arrived in Bahrain to help quell the unrest 
after being sent by the Gulf Cooperative Council. The following day, the King of 
Bahrain declared a state of emergency. The state of emergency resulted in severe 
restrictions being placed upon the freedom of assembly and expression and the 
prohibition of the continued operation of NGOs, political societies, and unions. As 
a result of this declaration, the General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions 
(hereinafter “GFBTU”) called a strike that lasted until 22 March. 
 
The above issues, and their subsequent impact on internationally recognised 
labour rights, were highlighted in a public petition of the AFL-CIO sent to the 
OTLA on 21 April 2011.241 The petition alleged that Bahrain had failed to comply 
with labour rights obligations within the US-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement. The 
Government had taken a number of actions that resulted in such lack of 
compliance, including the arbitrary detention of activists and the suspension of 
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the Bahrain Medical Society Board due to their continued treatment of 
protesters. Additionally, many trade union leaders and members had been 
dismissed, or prosecuted, as a result of their involvement with the strikes that 
followed the protests.242 The ILO had previously raised concerns with such 
actions taken against union members,243 especially in light of their ability to 
strike for reasons other than internal disputes.244 The petition stated that the 
freedom of association could not be properly exercised within the climate of fear 
created by the Government of Bahrain. 
 
The petition was accepted for review on 10 June 2011. The OTLA undertook a 
thorough investigation and produced a report on 20 December 2012 that 
concluded that the labour rights environment within Bahrain had deteriorated 
since the unrest.245 Bahrain, by failing to remedy shortcoming in the legal 
framework that was relied upon by employers to dismiss union members 
following the strikes, had failed to comply with obligations under Article 15(1) of 
the U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement. Despite the creation of a tripartite 
committee charged with overseeing the reinstatement of dismissed workers, 
involving the Minister of Labour, the Chamber of Commerce, and the GFBTU, this 
was still insufficient to address certain concerns.246 The OTLA recommended a 
number of concrete steps to be taken to address the inconsistencies, including 
explicit prohibition on discrimination in employment on the basis of religion of 
political persuasion, amendment of criminal sanctions on those involved in the 
strikes, and the initiation of investigations into allegation of intimidation and 
harassment of union members by employers. 247  Additionally, the OTLA 
recommended that cooperative consultations be requested by the U.S. in order to 
properly resolve the issues.248 
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The recommendations of the OTLA, in relation to request for cooperative 
consultations, were followed and a formal request for such consultations was 
made on 6 May 2013.249 The request highlighted the fact that Bahrain had failed 
to meet the obligation to ensure that the freedom of association and the 
elimination of discrimination were recognised and protected by domestic law,250 
and the need to ensure domestic protections were improving in line with 
international standards.251 Bahrain had failed to address shortcomings in law 
relating to the protection of freedom of association and discriminatory practices 
against Shia employees. The request, however, pointed out that no issues 
regarding obligations that could give recourse to the full dispute settlement 
proceedings had occurred.252 This decision to request cooperative consultations 
was motivated by a “sincere hope ... that consultations will produce a concrete 
plan of action, based on recommendations in the Labor Department’s report, 
which will strengthen labor protections in Bahrain and help prevent future 
violations of workers’ rights”.253 In June 2013 the consultations began and a 
subsequent round has also occurred. As of February 2015 the consultations have 
not concluded and the U.S. are still continuing support in Bahrain’s efforts to 
tackle freedom of association and discrimination shortcomings in their domestic 
law.254  
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4.2.7. – Peru 
 
On 30 December 2010, the Peruvian National Union of Tax Administration 
Workers (SINAUT) submitted a petition alleging that their employer, an 
executive branch of the Government, had failed to comply with labour laws 
relating to the right to collective bargaining.255 Failure to comply with such 
domestic labour laws was allegedly in violation of the labour rights provisions 
within the US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement. In order to establish a violation 
of this obligation there is, as discussed above,256 a need to demonstrate that the 
failure affected trade between the Parties.257 
  
The petition was accepted for review on 19 July 2011.258 Following engagement 
with both the submitters and the Government of Peru, the OTLA found that no 
further action was required and no subsequent recommendations relating to 
steps to be taken or cooperative consultations were made.259 The Peruvian 
Minister of Labour and Promotion of Employment had fulfilled the duties 
imposed by domestic collective bargaining laws. Additionally, although the 
employer had failed to comply with certain deadlines contained within the 
collective bargaining laws, certain legal ambiguities prevented a finding that 
there had been a failure to comply, or effectively enforce, the relevant domestic 
laws. The issue of whether the matter concerned related to trade between the 
Parties was not raised in substance in either the original petition, or the OTLA 
review report. The review report noted the willingness of Peruvian authorities to 
cooperate and discuss in a productive manner with U.S. authorities. Additionally, 
since the filing of the petition the Government had taken a number of steps to 
clarify the existing legal ambiguities and further facilitate the collective 
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bargaining rights of workers.260 
 
4.2.8. – United States – Cambodia Textile Agreement 
 
This agreement, as noted above, provided increased quotas for apparel and 
textile exports from Cambodia to the U.S. in the event that compliance with 
internationally recognised workers’ rights and domestic labour laws were also 
increasing. In order to add legitimacy to the project, the ILO undertook 
monitoring of privately run factories operating in the industry. The initial 
operation of the Textile Agreement, and the results of the subsequent monitoring 
reports, shall be examined in order to broadly assess the extent to which the 
agreement has been fully implemented. 
 
An initial shortcoming in the monitoring process conducted by the ILO was the 
fact that participation by factories was voluntary. This resulted in an incentive 
for firms to stay out of the monitoring process: the burden of improving labour 
rights compliance could fall on other firms, whilst the firms that did not 
volunteer could continue to benefit from increased quotas. This “free-rider” 
problem was recognised by the Cambodian Government and addressed by a 
regulation that only allowed firms that were participating in the monitoring 
process to benefit from the increased quotas.261 Once the programme was 
properly established, it created a unique system of corporate self-regulation. 
Exporting factories had incentives to increase compliance with labour laws, due 
to the potential for increased quotas, and also negative pressure from other 
factories not to drop standards and risk quotas for the entire sector. Additionally, 
U.S. importing companies, who were concerned about how tacit support of poor 
working conditions could damage their reputation, were now able to choose 
their suppliers based on transparent, independent, and reliable monitoring 
reports from the ILO. The successful monitoring scheme overseen by the ILO 
continued beyond the end of the agreement262 and has been the catalyst for the 
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ILO and International Finance Corporation’s “Better Work” programme that 
been established in other countries within the region.263 
 
Reports from the ILO included an initial first round of monitoring where 
shortcomings were identified. Following this, the factories were given a period of 
time to implement ILO recommendations in order to improve compliance before 
a second inspection. In the report following this second inspection, the factories, 
whether compliant or not, were mentioned by name. In general, the reports 
showed an improvement in compliance by the factories. These improvements 
resulted in increased quotas for the industry.264 However, the agreement did not 
only bring about practical improvement in the situation at factory level. 
Institutional changes, as a result of the dialogue between the parties and the ILO, 
were also positive results stemming from the agreement. The creation of a 
National Arbitration Council, that aimed to resolve workplace disputes without 
the need for strikes, was brought about as a result of the cooperative discussions 
mandated by the agreement. This Council has improved the dispute settlement 
system in Cambodia for workers, and promoted the rule of law. 
 
As can be seen, the innovative U.S.-Cambodia Textile Agreement was successful 
in both improving compliance with labour rights in private factories and the 
general system for labour rights protections within Cambodia. The ILO 
monitoring was of significant importance in developing a system that could be 
relied upon by parties, and private U.S. importers, in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of the regime. The continuation of the monitoring programme by 
the ILO, and the subsequent “Better Work” campaign pursued in the region, 
shows that benefits of the agreement have extended beyond its expiration. 
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4.2.9. – Conclusion 
 
As can be seen from the above, the number of submissions made differs amongst 
the various U.S. agreements. Under the NAALC, a large number of submissions 
have been made. Of the submissions that have been reported upon, a number 
have resulted in ministerial agreements that include cooperative activities to be 
carried out in order to ensure further compliance. However, a striking feature in 
relation to the NAALC system is that no submission has resulted in the 
establishment of an ECE or an Arbitral Panel. 
 
In relation to the other U.S. Free Trade Agreements, a number of submissions 
have been accepted and reported upon by the OTLA. This has resulted in 
concrete recommendations to improve the labour rights situation in a number of 
instances. The implementation of these recommendations by the other party, 
which should lead to full compliance with labour rights obligations, is monitored 
by the OTLA and in certain cases of non-compliance this has resulted in 
suggestions for cooperative consultations. Most importantly, in relation to the 
situation involving Guatemala under the DR-CAFTA, the U.S. have taken the 
unprecedented step of establishing an Arbitral Panel to consider the issue. This 
could eventually lead to the imposition of an annual monetary assessment of up 
to $15 million (U.S.). The proceedings under the Arbitral Panel have, however, 
not yet concluded.  
 
4.3. – European Union Free Trade Agreements  
 
 4.3.1. – Introduction 
 
As discussed above, the EU Free Trade Agreements contain similar mechanisms 
for implementation of labour rights obligations. However, no substantive issues 
have been raised as a part of these procedures. Despite this, in certain instances, 
the establishment of implementation and advisory bodies as required under the 
various agreements has resulted in information pertaining to implementation of 
the agreements at a more general level. Additionally, monitoring reports 
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produced by the EU provide further information on the state of implementation 
of a number of agreements containing labour rights protections. 
 
The following shall set out information obtained in relation to the EU agreements 
with CARIFORUM States, Colombia and Peru, and South Korea. With regards to 
the EU-Central America Association Agreement, the Civil Society Dialogue Forum 
and the Board on Trade and Sustainable Development, established under the 
agreement, have met.265 However, neither the Board, nor the civil society 
advisory group, have published any substantive information on implementation 
of the agreement with regards to labour rights obligations contained within the 
agreement. The agreements concluded with Georgia and Moldova have produced 
no relevant information regarding implementation. 
 
 4.3.2. – CARIFORUM 
 
Since the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and 
CARIFORUM states (hereinafter “EPA”) in October 2008, both parties have been 
working closely on implementation of the agreement. In general, this 
implementation has taken three forms: support of the CARIFORUM Governments 
and organisations; the holding of both regions to account for obligations under 
the agreements; and, helping Caribbean businesses to understand and utilise the 
agreement.266 With regard to this first form, the EU adopted a €47million project 
from 2012-2015 in order to assist Governments and businesses in the Caribbean 
region.267 The project aimed to assist Governments with modernising their tax 
raising methods, assist businesses in complying with EU health and safety, and 
environmental, standards, whilst also promoting the diversification of economies 
through growth in service industries. The EU also set out the specific bodies that 
would be provided with money as a part of this project. Money would be 
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provided to, inter alia, the Caribbean Development Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund who both support sustainable development projects.268 No 
money was being directly provided to organisations concerned with protection 
of labour rights or involved in the implementation of labour obligations under 
the agreement. The monitoring bodies under the agreement, intended to hold 
parties to account for the obligations they had undertaken, have generally been 
established and held their first meeting.269 However, one Committee established 
under the agreement had not yet been formed; the Consultative Committee. This 
Committee is comprised of business and civil society representatives as well as 
members of the EU Economic and Social Committee. It was intended for this 
Committee to hold its first meeting at some point in 2012.270 
 
Under the EPA, there was an obligation to undertake monitoring of the 
implementation of the agreement.271 It was decided that an initial report on 
implementation should be carried out within five years, and at five yearly 
intervals following this. The first implementation report, from September 2014, 
noted difficulties in assessing compliance with obligations relating to 
internationally recognised labour rights.272 On a very broad level, the Report 
noted that compliance could be measured by the existence of laws that address 
rights contained within the relevant EPA provisions and agencies with adequate 
resources to ensure compliance with such laws.273 The ratification record of 
CARIFORUM states, with regards to the eight ILO Fundamental Conventions, is 
generally positive. Only one State, St. Lucia, has not ratified all eight. The Report 
concluded that despite there being no comprehensive survey on the level of 
protections within CARIFORUM states, the level of social protections within such 
states outstripped those in other developing countries.274 In relation to the 
obligations to not reduce levels of protection in order to attract foreign 
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investment of trade, so-called “social-dumping”, the Report noted that no cases 
had been brought to any court or arbitration body raising such issues.275 As 
discussed above, the dispute settlement procedure within the EPA requires the 
parties to nominate five experts each to sit on a Panel.276 The EU had presented a 
list with their five experts, and a further five available for mutual acceptance. 
However, the CARIFORUM states had not yet nominated any individuals.277  
  
4.3.3. – Colombia and Peru 
 
The implementation of the Colombia and Peru Trade Agreement is subject to an 
annual monitoring report carried out by the EU.278 This report includes an 
overall assessment of trade flows and information on activities of the 
implementation and monitoring bodies established under the agreement. The 
Sub-Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, which is part of the 
Trade Committee established under the agreement and comprises a number of 
ministerial level representatives that oversee implementation, held its first 
meeting in Lima, Peru on 6 February 2014.279 The Subcommittee agreed on a list 
of experts to be used in the event of proceedings under the Trade Agreement. 
The Sub-Committee also shared experiences on how to best involved civil society 
in relevant sustainable development discussions at a domestic level. Each of the 
parties also updated the Sub-Committee on the steps they had taken on 
implementation of labour related provisions, and especially ratification of the 
eight ILO Fundamental Conventions.280 The EU monitoring report also noted the 
agreement of parties to continue to share information on measures relating to 
freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the prohibition of child and 
                                                        
275 Ibid. 
276 Article 221, EU-CARIFORUM, Economic Partnership Agreement, (2008). 
277 EU, “CARIFORUM Report”, (2014), page 58. 
278 Article 13, European Union, “Regulation (EU) No 19/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 15 January 2013 implementing the bilateral safeguard clause and the stabilisation 
mechanism for bananas of the Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member 
States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part”, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L 17/1. 
279European Commission, European Union, “Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU-Colombia/Peru Trade 
Agreement”, (4 December 2014), COM(2014) 718 Final, (hereinafter, “EU, “Colombia/Peru 
Report”, (2014)”), page 6. 
280 EU, “Colombia/Peru Report”, (2014), page 8. 
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forced labour.281  
 
4.3.4. – South Korea 
 
As discussed above, a number of institutions relating to implementation of 
labour related organisations were established under the EU-Korea FTA.282 The 
Domestic Advisory Groups (hereinafter “DAG”), comprising of representatives 
from labour, environmental, and business organisations, has held annual 
meeting to discuss implementation of the EU-Korea FTA. At the first annual 
meeting, in Brussels, Belgium, on 27 June 2012, the DAG examined the 
ratification record of the fundamental ILO Conventions of both parties.283 The 
DAG noted that Korea had fallen short of international labour standards in a 
number of areas. This issue was discussed further at the second meeting, of 12-
13 September 2013, where seminars were held on labour rights in the 
contracting parties with a focus on the fundamental rights contained within the 
ILO 1998 Declaration.284 Following these seminars the DAG published their 
conclusions which asked Korea to remove obstacles that were preventing 
ratification of ILO Conventions relating to freedom of association, collective 
bargaining, and forced and child labour. The EU had also raised similar concerns 
during the second meeting of the Trade and Sustainable Development 
Committee.285 The EU also encouraged Korea to cooperate closely with the ILO in 
order to ensure ratification of the relevant Conventions.  
 
In furtherance of these concerns, the DAG submitted a letter to Karel De Gucht, 
the EU Commissioner for Trade, requesting the initiation of Governmental 
                                                        
281 Ibid. 
282 See Chapter 3.4.3. above. 
283 EU-Korea FTA Civil Society Forum, “Minutes of 1st Meeting”, (27 June 2012), available at 
http://portal.eesc.europa.eu/eu-korea-dag/Civil-Society-Forum/Meetings/Pages/1st-SC-
Forum.aspx, (last accessed 9 May 2015). 
284 EU-Korea FTA Civil Society Forum, “Minutes of 2nd  Meeting”, (12 December 2013), available at 
http://portal.eesc.europa.eu/eu-korea-dag/Civil-Society-Forum/Meetings/Pages/The-2nd-SC-
Forum.aspx, (last accessed 9 May 2015). 
285 Trade and Sustainable Development Committee under the Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement, 
“Joint Statement of the 2nd Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development under 
the Korea-EU FTA”, (11 September 2013). 
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Consultation under Chapter 13, Article 14.286 The letter included four specific 
cases relating to trade unions that have resulted in violations of obligations 
under the EU-Korea FTA. One of such cases, involving the Korean Government 
Employee’s Union, had been considered by the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association.287 The issues raised, namely the refusal to register the union, was 
still ongoing despite the conclusions of the ILO Committee. The letter also 
identified the search and seizure of trade union property, including the use of 
police and SWAT teams, as violations of the right to freedom of association. 
However, this request for consultations has gone unnoticed and without 
response from either Party. The Trade and Sustainable Development Committee, 
in their third meeting during December 2014, did not raise the submission.288 
Additionally, the Report submitted to the EU Commission on 26 March 2015 on 
implementation of the agreement did not consider this submission.289 The 
Report mirrored the conclusions of the Trade and Sustainable Development 
Committee’s conclusions where they agreed to continue dialogue and share texts 
on progress towards ratification of the eight ILO Fundamental Conventions.  
 
This failure to properly take in to account the DAG’s submissions appears in 
stark contrast to previous assurances from the Committee and those contained 
within the EU-Korea FTA. The agreement itself mentions that Governmental 
consultations can be initiated as a result of any matter under the sustainable 
trade chapter, “including communications from the Domestic Advisory 
Group”.290 Additionally, the Trade and Sustainable Development Committee had 
previously noted their intention to consider any communications from the DAG 
and the Civil Society Forum and make conclusions in respect of any such 
                                                        
286 EU-Korea Domestic Advisory Group, “Letter to Karel De Gucht: Serious Violations of Chapter 13 
of the EU-Korea FTA”, (13 January 2014), available at http://portal.eesc.europa.eu/eu-korea-
dag/About-DAG/Pages/Adopted-Documents.aspx, (last accessed 9 May 2015). 
287 Committee on Freedom of Association, ILO, “The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions et al.,  
Case No 1865”, Complaint Date 14 December 1995. 
288 Trade and Sustainable Development Committee under the Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement, 
“Joint Statement of the 3rd Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development under 
the Korea-EU FTA”, (8 December 2014). 
289 European Commission, European Union, “Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU-Korea Free Trade 
Agreement”, (26 March 2015), COM(2015) 139 Final. 
290 Chapter 13, Article 14(1), EU-Korea, Free Trade Agreement, (2010). 
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submissions.291 
 
4.3.5. – Conclusion 
 
In contrast with the U.S. agreements discussed above, there have been no 
instances of the mechanisms for quasi-dispute settlement being used in relation 
to the EU agreements. The EU agreements do place a much greater emphasis on 
cooperation, and this has been implemented through meetings of various bodies 
established under the agreements. However, the monitoring of implementation 
in relation to the CARIFORUM agreement included very shallow discussion of 
labour issues in comparison with other more economic issues contained within 
the report. Finally, in the case of the EU-Korea FTA, the attempts by the DAG to 
initiate consultations have not resulted in any action taken. This should be 
contrasted with the generally positive efforts of the AFL-CIO discussed above 
when submitting cases to the U.S. OTLA, despite the fact that the DAG is 
specifically mandated to present such submissions under the agreement and the 
parties have recognised the need to consider and react to such submissions. 
  
                                                        
291 Trade and Sustainable Development Committee under the Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement, 
“Joint statement to the Civil Society Forum on the outcomes of the 1st Trade and Sustainable 
Development Committee”, (27 June 2012), page 2. 
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Chapter 5 – Generalised Schemes of Preference 
 
5.1. – Introduction 
 
Generalised Schemes/Systems of Preferences (hereinafter “GSP”) provide 
reduced tariff rates to certain beneficiary countries when importing goods to the 
preference giving country. These schemes are a departure from the general 
requirement to not discriminate amongst WTO members when trading.292 A 
permanent exception to this principle in favour of developing countries was 
made293 following acceptance of such schemes by the UNCTAD in 1968.294 
 
These schemes, adopted in order to increase export earnings of developing 
countries and thus accelerate their economic growth, have been adopted by a 
number of countries. A number of these schemes include specific provisions 
requiring respect for international human rights conventions, including those 
relating to labour rights. The eligibility criteria, and procedures for withdrawal 
of preferences, within such GSPs shall be fully set out below before an 
examination of their implementation in Chapter 6. 
 
5.2. – United States Generalised Scheme of Preference 
 
The U.S. GSP system, governed by the Trade Act 1974, includes two schemes; a 
general scheme, and one that covers “Least Developed Countries”.295 The former 
scheme provides eligible countries with duty free access to the U.S. market for a 
specific set of eligible products. The latter scheme applies to lesser developed 
countries and provides access to a greater number of products. The system 
provides the President, representing the executive branch, with ultimate power 
                                                        
292 This is known with the WTO as the “Most-Favoured-Nation” principle. It originated within the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947).   
293 WTO, “Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries”, (28 November 1979), L/4903. The GATT Contracting Parties had 
previously agreed to a ten year waiver to the Most-Favoured-Nation Principles in 1971. 
294 UNCTAD, Resolution 21(ii), “Preferential or free entry of exports of manufactures and semi-
manufactures of developing countries to the developed countries”, (1968), Second Conference, New 
Delhi, India. 
295 Section 2462, U.S., Trade Act, (1974).  
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in relation to the granting of eligibility for products and countries, and also 
removal of such preferences.296 
 
The eligibility criteria for the U.S. GSP begins with a list of countries that are 
automatically non-eligible, including, inter alia, EU Member States, Australia, 
Canada, and Japan.297 In addition to this, countries that have not taken, or are not 
taking, steps to afford internationally recognised rights to workers within their 
territory are ineligible.298 However, failure to take steps to afford such rights 
shall not prevent designation as a beneficiary if the President believes that 
making such a designation would be in the economic interests of the United 
States.299 Internationally recognised worker rights are defined as those covering 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, prohibitions on 
forced and child labour, and the need to provide a minimum wage and 
protections for occupational safety and health.300 Accordingly, one of the 
grounds for refusing access to the GSP scheme is a failure to protect these core 
labour rights. Once a country has been considered eligible, and receives various 
tariff preferences, there is the possibility of these being removed if the country 
falls in to one of the categories for ineligibility.301  
 
Despite the President having ultimate authority with regards to the granting and 
withdrawal of preferences, the implementation and administrative functioning 
of the GSP system is generally overseen by the U.S. Trade Representative and the 
GSP Subcommittee that consists of U.S. representatives from Departments of 
Agriculture, Commerce, Labour, and Immigration.302 These bodies carry out an 
annual review of the functioning of the GSP system.303 This annual review begins 
with a request for public petitions and comments from any interested parties 
and can relate to the addition of removal of preferences with regards to certain 
                                                        
296 Section 2462(a)(1) and (2), and (d)(1), U.S., Trade Act, (1974). 
297 Section 2462(b)(1), U.S., Trade Act, (1974). 
298 Section 2462(b)(2)(G), U.S., Trade Act, (1974). 
299 Section 2462(b)(2)(H), U.S., Trade Act, (1974). 
300 Section 2467(4), U.S., Trade Act, (1974). 
301 Including a change in circumstances that results in failure to afford internationally recognised 
worker rights, see Section 2462(d)(2), U.S., Trade Act, (1974). 
302 U.S. Trade Representative, “U.S. Generalized System of Preferences: GUIDEBOOK”, (July 2013). 
303 Section 2464, U.S., Trade Act, (1974). 
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countries or products and also the country practice relating to workers’ rights or 
intellectual property rights issues. Submissions generally come from foreign 
Governments, domestic and foreign companies, and labour or other public 
interest groups. The procedure for review of these submissions and suggestions 
include detailed written briefs, and oral hearings, before any decision is 
ultimately taken by the President on the issues raised.  
 
The U.S. GSP system was terminated on 31 July 2013.304 Since this date the 
preferences that previously would have been afforded under the GSP schemes 
have been no longer applicable, until the U.S. Congress reinstates the scheme.305 
However, the operation of the scheme prior to this termination still provides 
useful information relating to the implementation of social clauses that can be of 
relevance to other frameworks. 
 
5.3. – The European Union Generalised Scheme of Preference 
 
The GSP developed by the EU in 1971 was the first of its kind in the international 
trade system. Since its conception, the GSP has gone through a number of 
reformulations that are scheduled every ten years in order to allow the system to 
adapt to changes in global trade patterns. The EU GSP, since 2005, has included 
three specific schemes: the general scheme; an incentive scheme relating to 
respect for sustainable development and good governance; and, a specific system 
of preferences for the least developed countries.306 The specifics of these 
systems, as contained within the latest relevant EU Regulation,307 shall be set out 
before the system for withdrawal of benefits is discussed. 
 
                                                        
304 Section 2465, U.S., Trade Act, (1974). 
305 U.S. Trade Representative, “GSP Expiration: Frequently Asked Questions”, (November 2014), 
available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/FAQs-on-GSP-Expiration-Nov2014_4.pdf, (last 
access 7 May 2015). 
306 See European Union, “Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 applying a scheme 
of generalised tariff preferences”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 169/1. 
307 The EU GSP is implemented by way of Regulations that expire after a three year period.  
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5.3.1 – Generalised Scheme of Preference, Generalised Scheme of Preference 
Plus, and Everything But Arms 
 
The GSP affords certain states the ability to export goods to the EU market whilst 
enjoying reduced tariffs on such goods. The criteria for the GSP scheme states 
that all States, apart from those that are classed as high or upper-middle income 
countries by the World Bank or those that enjoy similar preferential market 
access through other trade agreements with the EU, will qualify for the tariff 
benefits.308 The countries that do not fall within the aforementioned categories, 
and are therefore eligible for GSP tariff benefits, are set out in Annex II of the 
Regulation. This list is reviewed every year in light of the most recent reports of 
the World Bank. The scheme only covers a specific list of products that are set 
out within the Regulation. Due to the importance placed on fostering 
industrialisation in order to promote sustainable growth in the economies of 
developing countries, the majority of products covered by the GSP scheme are 
manufactured or semi-manufactured.309 As of October 2014, 34 countries 
enjoyed preferences under the general GSP.310 
 
The Generalised Scheme of Preference Plus (hereinafter “GSP+”) was adopted in 
2005 after public consultations on how the EU’s system should be updated. The 
promotional scheme places an importance on principles such as sustainable 
development and good governance. The products covered by this scheme are 
generally the same as covered under the general GSP scheme but instead of mere 
reductions in tariffs, the GSP+ scheme affords complete removal of tariffs. As of 
October 2014, 13 countries received preference under this scheme.311 In order to 
qualify for this scheme, the country must satisfy a number of criteria. Firstly, the 
country must satisfy the eligibility criteria relating to acceptance to the GSP 
                                                        
308 Article 4, European Union, “Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of 25 October 2012 applying a 
scheme of generalised tariff preferences”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 303/1, 
(hereinafter “EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012)”). 
309 Bartels, L., “The Trade and Development Policy of the European Union”, (2007), The European 
Journal of International Law, Volume 18:4, page 740. 
310 European Union, “GSP Info Pack”, (October 2014), page 2. 
311 European Union, “GSP Info Pack”, (October 2014), page 3. 
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scheme.312 Additionally, the country must be considered “vulnerable” as a result 
of a lack of diversification in trade products and poor integration into the 
international trade system.313  The main feature of the eligibility criteria, 
however, relates to an obligation to ratify and effectively implement a number of 
international Conventions that relate to human rights, labour rights, and 
environmental issues.314 The State also undertakes to accept the monitoring 
procedures of the Conventions and also the European Commission (hereinafter 
“EU Commission”). These monitoring procedures, and the general provisions 
relating to withdrawal of benefits, shall be discussed after the final scheme 
relating to the least developed countries is set out. 
 
The third variation within the EU GSP system is referred to as the “Everything 
but Arms” scheme. This scheme is available to States that are defined as “Least 
Developed” by the UN, and allows duty and quota free access to all products from 
these States, except ammunition and arms.315 As of October 2014 there were 49 
beneficiaries under this arm of the EU GSP system.316 
 
Despite only the GSP+ regime including specific eligibility provisions relating to 
compliance with international labour conventions, the preferences afforded 
under all schemes can be removed due to non-compliance with certain 
international human rights conventions.317 The list of conventions includes the 
either fundamental ILO Conventions.318 The operation of this removal procedure 
shall be examined further below. 
 
5.3.2. – Mechanisms 
 
In general, the systems for removal of tariff preferences afforded under these 
schemes are identical. However, different reporting mechanisms exist in relation 
                                                        
312 Article 9(1), EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). 
313 Article 9(1)(a), EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). 
314 Annex VIII, EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). The list includes the eight core ILO conventions 
within the ILO 1998 Declaration. 
315 Articles 17 and 18, EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). 
316 European Union, “GSP Info Pack”, (October 2014), page 3. 
317 Article 19(1)(a), EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). 
318 Annex VIII, EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). 
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to the GSP+ scheme. Such reporting mechanisms shall be set out before a 
discussion of the general tariff withdrawal system. 
 
This mechanism under the GSP+ scheme, in addition to the obligation to adhere 
to the monitoring mechanisms under the various Conventions, results in the EU 
Commission regularly reviewing the implementation of the various Conventions 
by beneficiary States. Every two years the EU Commission is mandated to report 
to the European Parliament and the Council of the EU on the ratification status of 
the labour Conventions, their implementation, and the beneficiary State’s 
compliance with Convention reporting obligations.319 This report can be used in 
the specific process relating to temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences under 
the GSP+ scheme.  
 
Under the GSP+ scheme, unlike the general GSP and Everything but Arms 
schemes, the beneficiary State agrees to a number of obligations. If these 
obligations, including the ratification and implementation of the Conventions, 
compliance with reporting procedures under the Conventions, and an agreement 
not to formulate reservations contrary to the object and purpose of the 
Convention, are not complied with then the EU Commission may temporarily 
remove benefits from the State.320 The burden of proof in such situations is on 
the State to show that they have fully implemented the Conventions in question 
or otherwise complied with obligations.321  
 
In addition to this procedure, there is a general procedure for the temporary 
withdrawal of benefits that is relevant to all three schemes. The temporary 
withdrawal of benefits under any scheme can be justified in a number of 
situations, one of which is serious and systematic violations of principles laid 
down in the eight ILO Conventions that protect the fundamental labour rights 
contained within the ILO 1998 Declaration.322 If the EU Commission believes that 
a beneficiary State under any of the schemes had undertaken such activity, then 
                                                        
319 Article 14, EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). 
320 Article 15(1), EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). 
321 Article 15(2), EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). 
322 Article 19(1)(a), EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). 
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an investigation is carried out.323 Following the decision to investigate, if the EU 
Commission believes the complaints are legitimate, the beneficiary State in 
question is placed under a period of monitoring and evaluation.324 During the 
process surrounding a decision to investigate, the investigation itself, and the 
monitoring and evaluation phase, information from the beneficiary State and 
relevant reports of international bodies and other third parties are of central 
importance. 325  Prior to any decision regarding withdrawal of benefits a 
beneficiary State or a third party can request an oral hearing. Once an informed 
decision is made by the EU Commission on whether to withdraw the tariff 
preferences or not then this decision is passed on to the beneficiary State and the 
Council of Ministers, who formally adopt the EU Commission’s recommendation. 
In the event that tariff preferences are removed, the beneficiary State has the 
ability to request review of the decision once it believes that the actions that lead 
to the removal have been rectified.326  
 
5.3.3. – Conclusion 
 
The procedure within the various schemes under the EU GSP result in failure to 
respect of the ILO fundamental labour rights being punishable with withdrawal 
of tariff preferences. Additionally, failure to satisfy reporting obligations in 
relation to the eight ILO core labour Conventions, or a host of other human rights 
conventions, can result in preferences under the GSP+ being withdrawn. The 
procedure leading up to a decision to withdraw such benefits is principally 
carried out by the EU Commission, although they have the ability to consider 
reports from international monitoring bodies and any other relevant third 
parties.  
 
                                                        
323 Article 19(3), EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). 
324 Article 19(4)(b), EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). 
325 Article 19(6), EU, “GSP Regulation”, (2012). See also, Article 1, European Union, “Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1083/2013 of 28 August 2013 establishing rules related to the 
procedure for temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences and adoption of general safeguard 
measures under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council 
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 
293/16, (hereinafter “EU, “GSP Removal Rules”, (2013)”). 
326 Article 7(1), EU, “GSP Removal Rules”, (2013). 
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5.4. – Other Systems 
 
The Canadian General Preferential Tariff (hereinafter “CGPT”) was first 
introduced in 1974.327 Following on from this, in a similar vein to other systems 
discussed above, a further scheme was introduced for Least Developed Countries 
in 1983. The Canadian Economic Action Plan 2013 aimed to renew and 
modernise the CGPT. In implementation of this action plan, on 1 January 2015, 
72 beneficiaries were removed from the CGPT328 and two states were removed 
from the Least Developed Countries scheme as a result of economic progress.329 
The system in its current form has been extended until 31 December 2024. 
Under the Customs Tariff Act 1997, the principal text relating to the CGPT 
system, the Governor has ultimate discretion whether to extend or remove 
preferences with regards to any country.330 The use of this discretion follows a 
recommendation from the Minister of Finance but no further considerations, 
such as compliance with international labour rights, are included within the 
governing text.  
 
Globally there are a number of other systems that provide general preferences to 
developing countries and least developed countries.331 However, none of these 
systems include provisions within the eligibility criteria relating to respect for 
international labour rights or similar provisions within grounds for their 
withdrawal. 
 
 
                                                        
327 UN Conference on Trade and Development, “Generalized System of Preferences: Handbook on 
the Scheme of Canada”, (2013), page ix.  
328 Canada, “General Preferential Tariff Withdrawal Order (2013 GPT Review)”, (27 September 
2013), P.C. 2013-967. 
329 Canada, “Least Developed Country Tariff Withdrawal Order (2013 GPT Review)”, (27 September 
2013), P.C. 2013-968. 
330 Section 34. Canada, Customs Tariff (S.C. 1997, c. 36). 
331 Thirteen in total. Ten that have been notified to the Secretariat of the UN Conference on Trade 
and Development: Australia; Belarus; Bulgaria; Estonia;, Japan; New Zealand; Norway; Russia;, 
Switzerland; and, Turkey, list available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/GSP/About-
GSP.aspx, (last accessed 7 May 2015). See also UN Conference on Trade and Development, 
“Generalized System of Preferences: List of Beneficiaries”, (2015), for the existence of schemes in 
Iceland and Kazakhstan. See also UN Conference on Trade and Development, “Handbook on the 
Preferential Tariff Scheme of The Republic Of Korea in favour of Least Developed Countries”, 
(2013), for the existence of a scheme in favour of Least-Developed Countries in South Korea. 
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5.5. – Conclusion 
 
As can be seen, the need to respect and implement a number of internationally 
recognised labour rights form central aspects of the criteria for initiation, and 
continuation, of preferences under both the U.S. and EU GSPs. Both of these 
schemes include procedures to fully investigate situations where non-
implementation of labour rights may have occurred. Additionally, the EU GSP 
systems also cover implementation of other international human rights and 
environmental conventions. The need for continued monitoring under both of 
these schemes should afford the parties the ability to fully ensure compliance 
with all labour rights requirements. Examples of actions taken by preference 
giving countries in order to assess compliance shall be set out in the following 
Chapter. 
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Chapter 6 – Implementation of Generalised Systems of 
Preference 
 
6.1. – Introduction 
 
The above has charted the content, and mechanisms for implementation, of 
labour rights provisions within the U.S. and EU GSPs. Additionally, the 
withdrawal provisions of the CGPT, although it includes no specific reference to 
labour rights, have also been outlined. The following shall include discussion of 
instances where unilateral preferences have been removed for issues relating to 
compliance with “social clauses” under the U.S. and EU GSPs, and also 
withdrawal under the CGPT. 
 
6.2. – United States Generalised System of Preferences 
 
6.2.1. – Introduction 
 
The following section shall discuss instances in which the mechanisms within the 
U.S. GSP relating to review and suspension of preferences have been 
implemented. In general, accessing information relating to situations that have 
been concluded, through withdrawal of preferences or the decision to take no 
further action prior to 2013, has been troublesome. Secondary sources show that 
preferences have been suspended in fifteen instances in total in relation to 
labour rights concerns.332  However, detailed information relating to such 
decisions to suspend is only available in relation to the most recent decision 
concerning Bangladesh. Additionally, investigations are currently ongoing in 
relation to six other countries 333  and information is available on these 
                                                        
332 Includes Nicaragua, Romania, Paraguay, Chile, Myanmar, Central African Republic, Liberia, 
Sudan, Syria, Mauritania, and Maldives, see Tsogas, G., “Labour Standards in the Generalized 
Systems of Preferences of the European Union and the United States” (2000), European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Volume 6, Issue 3, 349-370 and Belarus, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
Guatemala, see Mosley, L. and Tello, L., “The Politics of Petitions: Interest Groups and Labor Rights 
in the US Generalized System of Preferences?”, (2013), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/papers/The%20Politics%20of%20Petitions%20Novem
ber%202013.pdf (last accessed 19 April 2015). 
333 Concerning Fiji, Georgia, Iraq, Niger, Philippines, and Uzbekistan. 
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proceedings. However, as a result of the expiration of the GSP as noted above, 
these investigations have been put on hold. Although the U.S. Trade 
Representative Office is engaging with relevant stakeholders they “do not expect 
to move toward final disposition of these reviews while the program is without 
authorization” and no further public hearings or request for public submissions 
are being made.334 Accordingly, the following discussion shall examine the 
complete process relating to the review of Bangladesh, followed by the steps 
taken in ongoing investigations in relation to the aforementioned six countries. 
 
6.2.2. – Bangladesh 
 
A number of petitions have been submitted in respect of Bangladesh’s systems 
for the protection of internationally recognised labour rights. As a result of a 
petition presented in 1990 regarding the failure to implement labour laws in 
Bangladesh’s Export Processing Zones (hereinafter “EPZ”) the Government of 
Bangladesh agreed to implement the relevant labour laws within certain 
deadlines. However, consistent failure to carry out their obligations, irrespective 
of previous statements espousing the intention to do so, resulted in a number of 
petitions being consistently submitted against Bangladesh.335 On 22 June 2007, 
the AFL-CIO presented a petition that included substantial new information 
alleging failure to implement labour protections relating to freedom of 
association, the right to organise and bargain collectively, the prohibition of child 
and forced labour, and the need to provide acceptable conditions of work.336 The 
petition also covered a number of industries and sectors as well as general 
remarks relating to harassment of trade unions and their members by the 
authorities. 
 
The first sector covered by the petition was, in a similar vein to previous 
                                                        
334 U.S. Trade Representative, “GSP Expiration: Frequently Asked Questions”, (November 2014), 
available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/FAQs-on-GSP-Expiration-Nov2014_4.pdf, (last 
access 7 May 2015), page 2. 
335 AFL-CIO, “Petition to Remove Bangladesh from the List of Eligible Beneficiary Developing 
Countries Pursuant to 19 USC 2462(d) of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)”, (22 June 
2007), (hereinafter “AFL-CIO, “Bangladesh Petition”, (2007)”), page 3. 
336 AFL-CIO, “Bangladesh Petition”, (2007), page 3. 
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petitions, Bangladesh’s EPZ. In 2004, the Export Processing Zone Workers’ 
Association and Industrial Relations Act, which included protections relating to 
the rights of workers to form and join trade unions, was passed into law.337 The 
Act included two implementation phases: firstly, the workers were able to create 
Representative and Welfare Committees to deal with health and safety at work 
issues; secondly, the workers could then create Workers’ Associations which 
acted in a similar manner to trade unions but without all the same powers. The 
petition raised concerns that had arisen under both periods of 
implementation.338 Members of the Welfare Committees had been unable to 
engage with employers on genuine health and safety concerns and, in certain 
circumstances, the members of such Welfare Committees were terminated and 
not reinstated upon review. The second stage of implementation, in reality, 
never came to fruition.339 The mechanisms necessary to establish the Workers’ 
Association have yet to be set up and, in a number of cases, individuals have been 
threatened by authorities for requesting steps to be taken towards establishing 
such Associations.340 The second industry within the petition is the Ready Made 
Garment industry. Despite an agreement in 2006 between workers and the 
Government about prohibition of the worst forms of violence that were 
prevalent in the industry, little has been done to implement such an 
agreement.341 Further to this, issues relating to payment of the minimum wage, 
failure to pay wages in a timely manner, and the failure to pay wage arrears were 
also raised in the petition. In the largely unregulated Shrimp and Fish Processing 
Industry, which is Bangladesh’s second largest exporting industry, there were 
concerns raised as to the prevalence of child labour, forced labour, and 
shortcomings in relation to occupational health and safety protections.342 Within 
this industry there is also little respect for the minimum wage or overtime pay. 
In general the Government has failed to respond to such issues when raised by 
relevant NGOs. In addition to this, when labour inspectors have raised concerns, 
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they have been reassigned to a different geographical region or industry.343 
Finally, the petition also highlighted a number of instances of repression of trade 
unions by Government forces. Since the state of emergency that had been 
declared on 11 January 2007, the civil liberties of all trade unions had been 
greatly restricted.344 Additionally, the petition outlined instances where the 
Governmental authorities had refused to register trade unions and forced 
resignation of union representatives through the use of forced detention and 
intimidation.345 International NGOs that had based themselves in Bangladesh to 
combat such issues were, in certain situations, removed by authorities.346  
 
The AFL-CIO highlighted that previous petitions, concentrating on EPZs, had 
resulted in changes being agreed upon, but these had rarely been implemented 
in practice. The petitioners believed that in addition to this reluctance to 
implement change, the other issues highlighted within other sectors 
demonstrated systemic deficiencies within Bangladesh’s system for protection of 
workers’ rights. Additionally, Bangladesh was not appearing to take steps 
towards rectifying the situation. Due to the cumulative effect of the 
shortcomings, the AFL-CIO urged the withdrawal of tariff preferences from 
Bangladesh.347  
 
The petition was accepted as part of the 2008 Annual Review. Following this 
acceptance, public hearings were held in October 2007, April 2009, and January 
2012 which included testimony from the petitioners and the Government of 
Bangladesh.348 After the January 2012 hearing, the petition was updated to 
include comments on the deterioration of the situation since the previous 
hearing. Following this updated petition, the U.S. GSP Subcommittee requested 
public comments on the potential withdrawal of preferences for Bangladesh349 
                                                        
343 Ibid. 
344 AFL-CIO, “Bangladesh Petition”, (2007), page 10. 
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347 AFL-CIO, “Bangladesh Petition”, (2007), page 13. 
348 See GSP Country Practice Review – Bangladesh, Docket ID: USTR-2012-0036, available at 
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which were discussed at a final public hearing in March 2013.350 As a result of 
this hearing, a recommendation was made to the President to withdraw 
preferences from Bangladesh due to a failure to respect, or take steps towards 
respecting, internationally recognised labour rights. This recommendation was 
followed by the President and, via a Presidential Proclamation of 27 June 2013, 
Bangladesh was removed from the list of beneficiaries under the GSP.351 
 
6.2.3. – Ongoing Investigations 
 
6.2.3.1. – Fiji 
 
The original petition concerning failure to protect fundamental labour rights 
within Fiji was submitted by the AFL-CIO and accepted as part of the 2011 
Annual Review on 12 July 2012.352 The petition alleged that the interim 
Government of Fiji had failed to afford protection to the freedom of association 
and rights relating to collective bargaining.353 In January 2012 the Public Order 
Act Amendment decree came into force and required prior authorisation by the 
police for trade unions to hold meetings. Additionally, the decree limited the 
rights of public sector workers to engage in collective bargaining.354 These 
allegations relating to the need for permission to hold meetings was contested by 
the Fijian authorities and, accordingly, the petitioners advised that a fact-finding 
mission should be sent by the U.S. in order to ascertain the reality of the 
situation.355 The petitioners also raised issues with violations of internationally 
recognised labour rights that had also occurred in practice. Trade union 
members had been assaulted and harassed without any repercussions and high 
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Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 127.  
352 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Public Hearing for U.S. Generalized System of 
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ranking union officials had been prevented from attending the International 
Labour Conference in 2011. 356  In response, the Government stated their 
intention to adopt a new Constitution that would adequately protect workers’ 
rights and also reforms of domestic labour legislation.  
 
Following the hearing of 12 October 2012, the AFL-CIO submitted an updated 
petition on 4 October 2013 that took into account developments in the situation 
within Fiji. The new Constitution, which ignored input from the independent 
Constitution Commission that had received 7,000 public submissions, did not 
include adequate protection of workers’ rights. The rights afforded by the 
Constitution included sweeping caveats that provided authorities with wide 
discretion to limit rights of workers in practice.357 The updated petition also 
noted the use of harassment and intimidation techniques to prevent workers 
from exercising their right to strike 358  and a continued failure by the 
Government to cooperate with the ILO.359 
 
6.2.3.2. – Georgia 
 
Following the 2003 “Rose Revolution”, attempts were made within Georgia to 
create a more representative and accountable Government. Following this, a new 
Labour Code was adopted without consulting relevant trade unions and other 
stakeholders. The new Labour Code included restrictions on both the freedom of 
association and the right to enter into collective bargaining.360 A petition was 
presented by the AFL-CIO on 20 September 2010 that raised three issues: the 
fact that the new Labour Code fell short of internationally recognised labour 
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standards; the use of extra-legal methods to attack trade unions; and, other 
failures to afford internationally recognised workers’ rights in practice. 
 
The petition alleged that the new Labour Code fell short of protections relating to 
freedom of association, the right to enter into collective bargaining, the right to 
strike, and child labour. The relevant provisions within the Labour Code allowed 
a court to suspend the activity of any trade union if it “stir[red] up social 
conflict”.361 This wide discretionary power was seen to undermine practical 
effect for the freedom of association.362 Additionally, there were no specific 
protections from discrimination afforded to trade union members during 
recruitment or termination proceedings, where such individuals would be at 
their most vulnerable.363 In relation to the right to strike there was no real 
coherent process contained within the new Labour Code364 and this right was 
undermined by the ability for the employer to request arbitration proceedings in 
all circumstances, not just where the strike concerned “essential services” as was 
recommended by the ILO.365 Finally, the Labour Code also failed to adequately 
protect against child labour by abolishing the labour inspectorate that was 
central to ensuring compliance with relevant obligations and also failing to 
include specific protections for employees aged between 13 and 15.  
 
In addition to these shortcomings in the domestic legislation, the petition also 
raised concerns about specific instances of interference with trade union 
activities that had occurred in Georgia.366 The effectiveness of a trade union in 
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the education sector had been severely undermined by the establishment of an 
NGO with close affiliation to public authorities. The NGO encouraged head-
teachers to advise staff to leave the trade union and join the NGO, whilst 
providing training incentives to do so. Additionally, the effectiveness of trade 
unions had generally been affected by the changing of rules relating to automatic 
deduction of membership fees from wages. As a result of the changes to these 
rules, the resources available to trade unions were greatly reduced. The 
petitioners also raised concerns relating to the dismissal of a number of trade 
union members and activists as a result of attempts to exercise their right to 
strike.367 Following the dismissals the courts were unwilling to reinstate them as 
they held there were sufficient protections within the Labour Code to protect 
against discrimination on grounds of trade union membership and, therefore, the 
dismissal must have resulted from legitimate concerns.  
 
The petition was accepted by the U.S. authorities as part of the 2010 annual 
review368 and accordingly a series of public hearings were carried out. These 
hearings were supplemented by written submissions from a number of 
organisations, including the Georgian Employer’s Association, the Georgian 
International Chamber of Commerce, and Women for Green Future, as well as 
oral submission from the petitioners, the Government of Georgia, the Business 
Association of Georgia, and two private companies.369 In the second oral hearing, 
which took place on 28 March 2013, it was noted that the new Georgian 
Government had drafted amendments to the Labour Code to take into account 
recommendations of the ILO in relation to the shortcomings that were also the 
subject of the original petition.370 The petitioners, however, believed that there 
were still deficiencies in the protections afforded by the re-drafted Labour Code 
and, anyway, “promises of change” included within the drafts that had not been 
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signed in to law were “not an accomplishment in and of themselves”.371 
Accordingly, despite potential improvements, the petitioners still advocated 
removal of tariff preferences from Georgia.372 As a result of the expiration of the 
U.S. GSP, as noted above, no further steps towards resolution of this review have 
been taken. 
 
6.2.3.3. – Iraq 
 
The original petition, submitted by the AFL-CIO, related to deficiencies in Iraq’s 
protection of internationally recognised labour rights and was accepted as part 
of the 2011 Annual Review. The petition alleged severe deficiencies in the 
Labour Code of 1987 relating to the freedom of association, the rights to enter 
into collective bargaining, and the prohibition of both child and forced labour.373 
Following the fall of Saddam Hussein there had not been any amendments to this 
Labour Code despite other areas of the law being developed. The original draft 
amendments to the Code did not include any rights relating to trade union 
members; instead, the authorities noted their intention to create a separate 
Trade Union Code.374 However, there have been significant delays in this process 
and no such Code has been forthcoming. The petitioners alleged that the current 
draft law, despite the provision of assistance and comments from the ILO 
Committee of Experts, did not include sufficiently clear language securing 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights.375 In addition to the 
issues relating to the Labour Code, the petitioners also noted a number of 
instances of trade union repression; including the detention of activists and the 
withdrawal of legal recognition of a number of trade unions.376 In response, 
during an oral hearing on 2 October 2012, the Iraqi ambassador to the U.S. 
recognised that Iraq was undertaking amendments in a number of areas 
following the fall of Hussein. The process was slow, however, the authorities 
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wished to ensure that the final draft of the law included adequate protections 
before it was accepted.377 Whilst this process continued, the legislature was in 
continued correspondence with the relevant advisory bodies of the ILO.378 
 
6.2.3.4. – Niger 
 
The petition filed by the International Labour Rights Fund on 20 July 2006 
related to instances of child and forced labour within Niger.379 The petition was 
supported by a number of reports and studies that states that tens of thousands 
of workers within Niger were forced into work under threats of punishment or 
torture.380 It was alleged that the Government has failed to take adequate steps 
to protect individuals from forced labour and, when such practices were 
uncovered, the authorities had not taken steps to rectify the situation. 
 
Despite the Constitution of Niger, and the domestic Labour Code, prohibiting 
forced labour, there had been few instances of investigations by the authorities 
despite evidence of the widespread use of forced labour.381 The Government 
made a number of promises in 2001 to initiate and implement an action plan to 
combat the problem but this never materialised. Additionally, despite the 
criminalisation of forced labour in June 2003, there had only been four 
subsequent investigations, which all resulted in no prosecution.382 The petition 
was accepted for review by the U.S. GSP Subcommittee and two public hearings 
have since been carried out.383 In these hearings, the Government of Niger has 
alleged that the situation has greatly improved. During the hearing on 28 March 
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2013, the Government stated that new domestic legislation prohibiting human 
trafficking had been adopted and implemented. This new legislation had already 
resulted in seventeen individuals being taken in custody and six prosecutions.384 
Additionally, improved training and the raising of awareness amongst the 
judiciary, the police force, and religious leaders, relating to issues of forced 
labour had been funded by the National Commission and were seen as an 
important step in improving the situation.385 The public hearings did not include 
submissions from the petitioners or any other interested bodies. Again, as a 
result of the expiration of the U.S. GSP, the public hearing in early 2013 was the 
last action taken towards disposition of this issue. 
 
6.2.3.5. – Philippines 
 
Within the Philippines, issues surrounding the prevalence of the repression of 
trade union activities were highlighted by a petition filed on 22 June 2007, again 
by the International Labour Rights Fund. The petition included information 
relating to extra-judicial killing and an increase of abductions of trade union 
leaders, members, and supporters.386 Such actions had been allegedly carried out 
by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines alongside members of 
national and local police forces, and private security forces.387 These allegations 
were supported by evidence from the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions.388 The widespread nature of such activities, in 
addition to common assaults on such individuals,389 resulted in the Philippines 
being classified as the second most dangerous country in the world for trade 
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unionists in 2006.390 In general, a culture of impunity existed within the 
Philippines with regards to these crimes.391 Alongside these grave concerns, the 
petition also covered issues relating to obstacles standing in the way of workers 
exercising their right to strike. Provisions and technicalities within the Labour 
Code allowed the assumption of jurisdiction and imposition of mandatory 
arbitration for all strike actions that related to “essential services”. However, the 
authorities broadly interpreted this term to include industries involving 
automobiles, hotels, and pineapple production.392 This mandatory arbitration 
resulted in a binding decision by the Secretary of State for Labour and 
Employment that would effectively result in termination of employment if not 
followed. Workers that did engage in collective strike action were often subject 
to criminal felony charges of sedition or violent dispersal of their pickets. The 
cumulative effect of these issues resulted in a severe diminishment of the 
strength of trade unions within the Philippines.  
 
The petition was accepted and resulted in a first set of public hearings on 24 and 
25 January 2012. During this hearing, the International Labour Rights Fund 
noted that although there had been a drop in the rate of extra-judicial killings as 
a result of international pressure in 2008 and 2009, this had reversed in recent 
years.393 The Secretary of State for Labour and Employment noted that the 
Government had undertaken a threefold action plan to address the issues within 
the petition.394 Increased training had been provided to the police and armed 
forces with the assistance of the ILO. Additionally, there had been increases in 
investigations and subsequent prosecutions by the Supreme Court. The 
Government were also undertaking reform of domestic law relating to the 
assumption of jurisdiction in arbitration cases to protect against arbitrariness 
and also to strengthen the rights of workers to organise and enter into collective 
bargaining. Following these hearings the U.S. Subcommittee on the GSP held a 
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further hearing on 28 March 2013 during which the Government again 
highlighted steps that were being taken to address deficiencies in the protection 
of workers’ rights. The Government had established the Interagency Committee 
on Extra-judicial Killings which presented detailed information on ongoing 
investigations in the pre-hearing brief. Furthermore, the Government were 
taking in to account recommendations of the ILO Committee of Experts in order 
to fully comply with the relevant conventions on freedom of association and the 
right to organise and bargain collectively.  
 
Following the expiration of the GSP there has been no formal disposition of the 
issue. However, the USTR believe that the investigation shall be closed, and no 
withdrawal of the Philippines’ preferences shall occur, once the programme has 
been reauthorized by the U.S. Congress.395 
 
6.2.3.6. – Uzbekistan 
 
The International Labour Rights Fund also submitted a petition on 21 June 2007 
in relation to instances of forced and child labour in the cotton industry within 
Uzbekistan.396 The Uzbekistani authorities failed to consider this an issue and 
instead believed the inclusion of children within the cotton harvest as a 
“patriotic act by the Uzbek youth”.397 Despite the Constitution and Labour Code 
prohibiting economic exploitation, the practice of mobilising the youth during 
the cotton harvest was widespread throughout Uzbekistan.398 The issues within 
the petition had been raised by both the ILO,399 the UN Committee on the Rights 
of the Child,400 and the UN Human Rights Committee.401 
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Following the acceptance of the petition, the U.S. GSP Subcommittee held public 
hearings including testimony from the Government of Uzbekistan and the 
petitioners. The public hearing on 28 March 2013402 was the last activity carried 
out in relation to these issues by the authorities before the expiration of the U.S. 
GSP in June 2013.   
 
6.2.4. – Conclusion 
 
The above provides a clear picture of the extent to which the mechanisms for 
labour protection are being implemented as part of the U.S. GSP. The full 
discussion of the Bangladesh issue shows the journey from original petition 
through to the withdrawal of benefits. The withdrawal of benefits, as noted 
above, has occurred on fourteen other occasions, however, no primary 
information was available on such instances. In general, the annual review 
proceedings under the U.S. GSP can take a number of years. For example, in the 
Bangladesh situation discussed above, the proceedings took six years from the 
original petition to removal of preferences. The expiration of the U.S. GSP has 
resulted in a number of situations that are currently under review being placed 
on hold. These six issues, once the programme has been reauthorized, may 
continue the U.S. practice of removing preferences for non-compliance with 
internationally recognised workers’ rights. 
 
6.3. – European Union Generalised Scheme of Preferences 
 
6.3.1. – Introduction 
 
As discussed above, preferences under any of the three strands of the EU GSP can 
be temporarily withdrawn for systemic violations of certain labour protections 
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by a beneficiary country. In making a decision about whether to remove 
preferences, the EU Commission carries out an investigation with the input of the 
Parties, third parties, and international monitoring bodies. As withdrawal can be 
motivated by failure to comply with the eight fundamental ILO Conventions, 
reliance is placed upon the reports of certain bodies within the ILO. The 
following contains all six investigations carried out under the procedure for 
withdrawal of preferences afforded by the EU GSP. The content of the original 
submission, the investigative process, and the final decision on the matter shall 
be set out in situations involving a number of beneficiary countries. 
 
6.3.2. – Belarus 
 
On 29 January 2003, 403  three international trade union organisations 404 
submitted a joint request to the EU Commission alleging violations of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining rights under ILO Conventions No. 87 and 
98.405 Such a request was submitted under Article 27 of the then applicable 
Regulation concerning the EU GSP,406 which allowed the EU Commission to 
initiate an investigation with regards to a certain beneficiary if they received 
information that includes sufficient grounds to do so. The request alleged 
specific issues with the domestic law of Belarus, which required authorisation 
prior to the establishment of a trade union organisation and included significant 
restrictions on foreign funding of such unions and other NGOs. In addition to 
this, the request contained information on specific instances of intimidation used 
by authorities to replace regional and sectoral union officials and interfere with 
union elections.407 
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The submitted request was examined by the EU Generalised Preferences 
Committee which subsequently decided that sufficient grounds existed to initiate 
a formal investigation into the situation in Belarus.408 This decision was 
intimated to the Belarusian authorities and made public. The public notice also 
called upon interested parties to “make themselves known in writing and submit 
and useful information to the EU Commission”.409 In response to the initiation of 
the investigation the Belarusian authorities denied any wrongdoing and ensured 
the EU Commission that they fully complied with the relevant ILO 
Conventions.410 However, information gathered during this initial investigation 
painted a different picture. 
 
During the investigation the EU Commission heavily relied upon research and 
reports produced by the ILO. An investigation into Belarus’ compliance with ILO 
Conventions began in November 2003, and the subsequent report by the 
Commission of Inquiry was published on 23 July 2004.411 The scathing report 
included evidence that Belarus had failed to comply with a number of obligations 
relating to the freedom of association and the right to organise and bargain 
collectively. The report also included twelve recommendations that the ILO 
urged Belarus to implement in order to rectify the situation. 412  These 
recommendations included the need to remove restrictions on the ability of 
trade unions to register, 413  the disbandment of the opaque Republican 
                                                                                                                                                              
association in Belarus in view of temporary withdrawal of benefits under the Scheme of Generalised 
Tariff Preferences (GSP)”, (14 February 2004), 2004/C 40/04, Official Journal of the European 
Union, (hereinafter “EU, ”Public Notice of Belarus Investigation”, (2004)”). The intimidation 
techniques included direct threats of dismissal, unlawful entry into union premises, and 
confiscation and destruction of union property and documents. 
408 European Commission, European Union, “Decision of 29 December 2003 providing for the 
initiation of an investigation pursuant to Article 27(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 
with respect to the violation of freedom of association in Belarus”, 2004/23/EC, Official Journal of 
the European Union.  
409 EU, ”Public Notice of Belarus Investigation”, (2004). 
410 European Council, “Belarus Removal Regulation”, (2006), § 4. 
411 ILO, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the 
International Labour Organization to examine Observance by the Government of the Republic of 
Belarus of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 
87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)”, (23 July 2004), 
(hereinafter “ILO, “Commission of Inquiry Report on Belarus”, (2004)”). 
412 ILO, “Commission of Inquiry Report on Belarus”, (2004), §§ 633ff. 
413 ILO, “Commission of Inquiry Report on Belarus”, (2004), Recommendation 2. 
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Registration Commission that oversaw such registration requests,414 thorough 
investigations into previous allegations of anti-union discrimination submitted 
by workers,415 and the amendment of a number of Belarusian laws to fully 
ensure complete compliance with international labour obligations.416 The ILO 
urged Belarus to implement these recommendations by 1 June 2005.417 
However, the EU Commission noted that no steps had been taken towards 
implementation.418 As a result of this evidence gathered during the investigation, 
the EU Commission decided to formally monitor and evaluate the labour rights 
situation in Belarus.419 This monitoring period would last for six months and if 
no effective implementation of the ILO recommendations occurred within the 
next eight months then a recommendation would be made to the European 
Council to withdraw tariff preference from Belarus.420 
 
During this monitoring period the ILO published a follow up to the Commission 
of Inquiry’s report.421 The report noted that the “Government [is] on a path to 
eliminating all remnants of an independent Trade Union in Belarus”422 and that 
there had been no progress or desire to implement the Commission of Inquiry’s 
recommendations. The ILO noted that there had been a “continued failure to 
implement the Convention”.423 As a result of these issues during the monitoring 
and evaluation period, the EU Commission recommended to the European 
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415 ILO, “Commission of Inquiry Report on Belarus”, (2004), Recommendation 7. 
416ILO, “Commission of Inquiry Report on Belarus”, (2004), Recommendations 9 and 10. 
417 ILO, “Commission of Inquiry Report on Belarus”, (2004), § 635. 
418 European Council, “Belarus Removal Regulation”, (2006), § 5. 
419 European Commission, European Union, “Decision of 17 August 2005 on the monitoring and 
evaluation of the labour rights situation in Belarus for temporary withdrawal of trade preferences”, 
2005/616/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, (hereinafter “European Commission, 
“Decision on monitoring of Belarus”, (2005)”). 
420 Article 2, European Commission, “Decision on monitoring of Belarus”, (2005). See also the 
public notice of this decision, “Announcement of the period for the monitoring and evaluation of 
the labour-rights situation in Belarus in view of the temporary withdrawal of benefits under the 
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Report, adopted by the Governing Body of the ILO during their 295th Session, (hereinafter “ILO, 
“Belarus Follow-up Report”, (2006)”. 
422 ILO, “Belarus Follow-up Report”, (2006), § 51. 
423 Committee on Freedom of Association, ILO, “Observation on Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) – Belarus”, (2006), International 
Labour Conference, 95th session. 
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Council that preferences be withdrawn from Belarus for a continued failure to 
comply and implement international conventions on freedom of association and 
the right to organise and collective bargaining. The Council consequently 
withdrew such preferences on 21 December 2006.424 The withdrawal took effect 
on 21 June 2007 due to Belarus failing to take up a final opportunity to prevent 
withdrawal through implementation of the ILO’s recommendations.425  
 
6.3.3. – Myanmar 
 
The prevalence of forced labour within Myanmar was brought to the attention of 
the EU Commission via a report submitted by the European Trade Union 
Confederation and the International Confederation of Trade Unions on 7 June 
1995.426 The report highlighted the exaction of labour from civilian population in 
order to assist military operations, development and infrastructure projects, and 
also tourist development projects. It was stated that the use of forced labour was 
a central feature of Myanmar’s domestic infrastructure policy. 427  The EU 
Commission considered this information, and the corroborating reports of the 
ILO,428 and decided to instigate an investigation into the use of forced labour in 
Myanmar. This decision was public disseminated and interested parties were 
afforded the opportunity to submit relevant information to the EU 
                                                        
424 European Council, “Belarus Removal Regulation”, (2006). 
425 European Commission, “Press Release: EU will withdraw GSP trade preferences from Belarus 
over workers’ rights violations”, (15 June 2007), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/june/tradoc_134943.pdf (last accessed 20 April 
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426 European Council, European Union, “Regulation (EC) No 552/97 of 24 March 1997 temporarily 
withdrawing access to generalized tariff preference from the Union of Myanmar”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, L085/8, (hereinafter “European Council, “Myanmar Removal Regulation”, 
(1997)”). 
427 European Commission, European Union, “Notice of initiation of an investigation of forced 
labour practices being carried out in Myanmar in view of a temporary withdrawal of benefits from 
the European Union’s Generalized Scheme of Preferences”, (20 January 1996), 96/C 15/03, 
(hereinafter “European Commission, “Initiation of Investigation” , (1996)”). 
428 ILO, “Report of the Committee set up to consider the representation made by the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution alleging non-
observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)”, (1994) and Committee 
on the Application of Standards, ILO, “Observation on Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) – 
Myanmar”, (1995), International Labour Conference, 82nd session. 
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Commission.429 The authorities of Myanmar responded and stated their belief 
that the practices highlighted in the report were in fact not in violation of 
obligations under ILO Convention No. 29 as they fell within the exceptions 
provided for in Article 2.430 However, similar arguments had been raised in 
response to ILO criticisms and, in a similar vein to the ILO’s treatment of the 
situation, such arguments were refused by the EU Commission. The EU 
Commission collected oral and written submissions that further corroborated 
the complaints made against Myanmar. Accordingly, on 24 March 1997 the 
Council adopted a Regulation that withdrew trade preferences from Myanmar.431 
However, if the circumstances justifying the removal no longer existed, such 
preferences could be reinstated.432 
 
Following the withdrawal of preferences within the EU context, the issue of 
forced labour in Myanmar continued to receive attention from the ILO. An ILO 
Commission of Inquiry, which concluded in 1998, reported the widespread use 
of forced labour within the country and included certain recommendations to 
rectify the situation.433 Such recommendations included the removal of domestic 
legislation that violated the obligations under the ILO’s Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and the proper enforcement of sanctions and 
protections contained within the Penal Code of Myanmar relating to forced 
labour.434 These recommendations, however, were not followed by Myanmar.435 
As a result of this, the ILO ended all cooperative activities with Myanmar in 1999 
unless they directly related to forced labour issues. 436 
 
                                                        
429 European Commission, “Initiation of Investigation”, (1996). 
430 European Council, “Myanmar Removal Regulation”, (1997). 
431 Article 1, European Council, “Myanmar Removal Regulation”, (1997). 
432 Article 2, European Council, “Myanmar Removal Regulation”, (1997). 
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the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance by Myanmar 
of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)”, (2 July 1998), (hereinafter “ILO, “Commission 
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434 ILO, “Commission Inquiry Report – Myanmar”, (1998), § 539. 
435 ILO, “Measures recommended by the Governing Body under article 33 of the Constitution – 
Implementation of recommendations contained in the report of the Commission of Inquiry entitled 
Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma)”, (2000), International Labour Conference, 88th session. 
436 ILO, “Resolution on the widespread use of forced labour in Myanmar”, (1999), International 
Labour Conference, 87th session and ILO, “Decision of the Governing Body concerning the 
application of the Conference Resolution”, (1999), Governing Body, 276th Session. 
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The ILO continued to monitor the situation in Myanmar with regards to forced 
labour. A report of the Committee on the Application of Standards, in 2011, 
noted that the tide appeared to be turning and authorities appeared more willing 
to implement recommendations and comply with obligations under the Forced 
Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29).437 The authorities had expressed intent to 
revise the offending domestic laws and had already carried out activities with 
the purpose of raising awareness of the issue of forced labour amongst ethnic 
minority groups. These changes resulted from the good governance priorities 
established by the newly elected President of Myanmar. Although no substantive 
changes had taken place, the ILO believed that these steps and intentions were 
sufficient to justify removal of the restrictions on assistance placed upon 
Myanmar in 2012.438 The EU Commission took note of this change of attitude by 
the ILO. In September 2012 the then EU Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gurcht, 
outlined the need to “underpin deep and important changes with real economic 
support” in Myanmar.439 This statement was accompanied by the intention to 
afford preferences to Myanmar again under the “Everything but Arms” 
programme due to the substantial progress made with regards to forced labour 
issues. These preferences were fully reinstated with regards to Myanmar on 22 
April 2013, sixteen years after their initial removal.440 
 
6.3.4. – El Salvador 
 
El Salvador was granted GSP+ beneficiary status under the first formulation of 
the scheme in 2005.441 Following the routine renewal of the scheme, all 
                                                        
437 Committee on the Application of Standards, ILO, “Observation on Forced Labour Convention, 
1930 (No. 29) – Myanmar”, (2011), International Labour Conference, 100th session. 
438 ILO, “Report of the subcommittee on the review of measures previously adopted by the 
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beneficiaries were required to apply again in order to have their tariff 
preferences continued. Beneficiaries had to show continued implementation of 
the relevant international human rights and labour rights Conventions in order 
to retain their beneficiary status.442  
 
On 16 October 2007, the Constitutional Court of El Salvador held that aspects of 
the ILO’s Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention (No. 87), (1948) (hereinafter “ILO Convention No. 87”) were 
incompatible with El Salvador’s Constitution.443 ILO Convention No. 87 is one of 
the international agreements that must be ratified and effectively implemented 
in order to gain tariff preferences under the GSP+ scheme.444 Specifically, the 
Constitutional Court held that the provisions stating that freedom of association 
should be afforded to all “without distinction whatsoever” was contrary to the 
Constitutional prohibition on such rights being extended to workers in the public 
sector.445 The EU Commission received notification of this decision and decided 
that it constituted sufficient grounds to open an investigation into the 
implementation of ILO Convention No. 87 in El Salvador.446 Tariff preferences 
under the GSP+ scheme were still provided to El Salvador pending the outcome 
of the investigation.447 
 
The EU Commission investigation took into account information provided by El 
                                                                                                                                                              
beneficiary countries which qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable 
development and good governance, provided for by Article 26(e) of Council Regulation (EC) No 
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442 Article 9(2), European Council, European Union, “Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 
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2008/316/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, L 108/29.  
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Salvador’s Government, the ILO, and two groups of interested parties that had 
responded to the public notice regarding the investigation.448 The Government 
highlighted the fact that a review of the Constitution had been launched in 2005 
to assess any potential conflicts between ILO Convention No. 87 and the 
Constitution.449 The subsequent report highlighted the same issues exposed in 
the Constitutional Court cases and so the legislature agreed to implement ILO 
Convention No. 87 whilst also undertaking reform of the Constitution to 
eradicate the inconsistencies relating to public sector workers.450 However, 
safeguards existed that required any amendment to the Constitution to be 
approved by two successive legislatures.451 Accordingly, the amendment to the 
Constitution had not yet come into force at the time of the Constitutional Court 
judgments. Information gathered from the ILO following the relevant judgments 
expressed “regret” over the decision and aspirations for the Constitutional 
changes to be brought in to force.452 Additionally, a complaint had been made to 
the Committee on the Freedom of Association alleging that the Union of 
Salvadorian Judiciary Employees had been refused legal status due to the 
relevant public bodies being obliged to follow the binding Constitutional Court 
decision.453 The Committee held that a violation of the freedom of association 
had occurred and included express expectations that the next legislature should 
approve the Constitutional amendments.454 
 
The EU Commission investigation concluded that El Salvador had taken steps, 
through the amendment of the Constitution, to fully implement ILO Convention 
No. 87. Additionally, on 27 May 2009, prior to the publication of the investigation 
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report, El Salvador’s new legislature had overwhelmingly voted in favour of the 
amendments to the Constitution.455 However, the EU Commission felt that 
amendments passed had not fully cured inconsistencies with ILO Convention No. 
87  due to restrictions still being placed upon the freedom of association for civil 
servants public officials, and the judiciary456; contrary to the recommendations 
of the ILO.457 Despite this, the EU Commission decided that El Salvador should 
continue to receive preferences under the GSP+ regime. Two successive 
legislatures of El Salvador had shown intention to fully implement and comply 
with obligations under ILO Convention No. 87 and, due to the incentive based 
nature of the GSP+ scheme, the preferences should remain in place in order to 
encourage El Salvador to adopt further, necessary amendments. This decision to 
not withdraw preferences was formalised in a later decision to terminate the 
investigation into El Salvador’s compliance with ILO Convention No. 87.458 
 
6.3.5. – Pakistan 
 
In 1995 a Human Rights Watch Report documented that instances of forced 
labour were rife in Pakistan.459 The report noted the widespread servitude 
imposed on workers through physical abuse, forced confinement, and debt 
bondage by employers. Following this report a number of trade unions 
petitioned the EU Commission to investigate the use of forced labour in 
Pakistan.460 Despite the information submitted, there was no investigation 
carried out by the EU Commission. Various reasons for this have been advanced, 
including attempts by the Pakistani authorities to derail the potential for an 
investigation and reluctance on behalf of EU Member States to initiate an 
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investigation.461 Recently, Pakistan applied to be included as a beneficiary under 
the GSP+ scheme which, as noted above, requires effective implementation of a 
number of international Conventions including the ILO’s Forced Labour 
Convention (No. 182), (1932).462 If the most recent conclusions of the relevant 
monitoring bodies show that certain Conventions are not effectively 
implemented then the application will be rejected.463 However, on 28 August 
2013 Pakistan was granted status as a beneficiary under the GSP+ scheme 
alongside nine other countries, thus showing the EU Commission was satisfied 
with their implementation of all international labour Conventions.464 
 
6.3.6. – Sri Lanka and Bolivia 
 
Other petitions have been submitted to the EU Commission regarding violations 
of other human rights conventions that beneficiaries are obligated to comply 
with under the GSP. In 2010, as a result of sustained failures to implement and 
protect rights contained within the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,465 the Convention against Torture,466 and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child,467 tariff preferences were withdrawn from Sri Lanka.468 During the 
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investigation proceedings the European Trade Union Confederation and the 
International Trade Union Confederation submitted information on 19 
November 2008469 but this was not a substantial aspect of the decision to 
remove preferences.  
 
Additionally, following Bolivian denouncement of the UN Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs (1961), and subsequent re-accession with a reservation 
regarding traditional use of coca leaves, the situation was investigated by the EU 
Commission.470 Following correspondence with the Bolivian Government and 
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the EU Commission decided that Bolivian 
legislation was still in accordance with, and effectively implementing, the UN 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961). Accordingly, the investigation was 
terminated without any further action.471 
 
6.3.7. – Conclusion 
 
The EU procedures within the GSP have rarely resulted in withdrawal of 
preferences. In contrast with the U.S. system, where preferences have been 
withdrawn fifteen times, EU preferences have only been withdrawn twice out of 
the four investigations relating to labour rights discussed above. Additionally, in 
contrast with the U.S. GSP proceedings discussed above, the resolution of EU 
investigations took a comparatively shorter period of time. A common theme 
running through the situations discussed above is the reliance on third party 
reports by the investigating body. Such reliance allows decisions regarding 
withdrawal of preferences to be intimately linked to compliance with the 
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relevant labour rights. The reinstatement of preferences for Myanmar shows 
that any removal is considered temporary and can be reversed in the event that 
compliance with labour standards is shown by the beneficiary country.  
 
6.4. – Canadian General Preferential Tariff 
 
As discussed above, no formal conditions exist for the withdrawal of tariff 
preferences under the CGPT. In deciding whether preferences should be 
withdrawn the Governor has ultimate discretion, although she/he will only act in 
pursuance of a recommendation from the Minister of Finance.472 In December 
2006, Canada imposed a number of economic sanctions on Belarus as a result of 
the deteriorating human rights situation in the country.473 The presidential 
election of 19 March 2006 was, in the opinion of international observers, 
severely flawed. The issues surrounding the run up to the election and the 
subsequent continuation of intimidation and unwarranted imprisonment of 
democratic supporters motivated Canada’s decision to place Belarus on an “Area 
Control List” which prohibited exports to Belarus unless on humanitarian or 
personal grounds.474 Following this general prohibition on exports, the Governor 
of Canada removed tariff preferences for Belarus that were previously afforded 
under the CGPT.475 The decision followed a recommendation of the Minister of 
Finance and again related to the human rights situation in Belarus.  This removal 
occurred a period of time after the general sanctions were imposed but was 
likely motivated by similar concerns relating to human rights, but not specifically 
labour rights, within Belarus. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
This thesis has charted the phenomena of “social clauses” throughout a number 
of international trade agreements and unilateral schemes of preference. In 
considering these clauses it is clear that although a regular feature in such 
instruments, their implementation by way of utilisation of procedures contained 
within such instruments is not such a common occurrence.  
 
Historically there had been a reluctance to create a formal link between trade 
and labour at an international level. Despite repeated attempts by the U.S., 
during the operation of the GATT and the negotiations surrounding the creation 
of the WTO, States that commented on the U.S. proposals were particularly 
concerned by the potentially protectionist repercussions of the vague proposals. 
Accordingly, these proposals were rejected and the WTO made clear, within the 
Singapore Ministerial Declaration, that labour issues fell outwith their 
jurisdiction and were best regulated and promoted by the ILO. 
 
However, since this refusal to bring labour rights issues into the international 
trade regime, there has been the emergence of many “social clauses” within 
trade agreements; both in the form of Free Trade Agreements and Generalised 
Schemes/Systems of Preferences. Many of these agreements have been 
concluded by the States that were previously concerned about the impact that 
labour rights provisions could have on their comparative advantage if included 
in the abovementioned multilateral frameworks. When comparing the content of 
these “social clauses” to the proposals of the U.S., the scope of the labour rights 
included are clearly defined. Additionally, the circumstances in which trade 
benefits can be restricted due to a failure to ensure fundamental labour rights 
are limited to specific rights, and specific forms of non-compliance. The concerns 
that States previously had, regarding protectionism and vague proposals, have 
been addressed by the specificity of these agreements. Further, the fact that 
proceedings regarding implementation would be free from the multitude of 
political considerations that could impact proceedings at a multilateral level 
under the GATT or WTO could be a further motivation for this emerging 
105 
 
acceptance of “social clauses” and the link between trade and labour. 
 
The NAALC, the first of instrument to formalise a link between trade and labour, 
contains complex mechanisms to implement labour obligations. These 
procedures however, mirroring the provisions of some other U.S. trade 
agreements, only apply to certain circumstances. Only matters that relate to 
trade and specific labour rights can lead to the eventual imposition of fines, thus 
creating a clear hierarchy amongst labour rights. Under the NAALC there have 
been a number of submissions made requesting review of compliance with 
certain “social clauses”. However, none of these issues have ever extended 
beyond the initial stage of ministerial consultations. This shows a clear 
reluctance to utilise the entirety of the implementation procedures available 
under the NAALC. Additionally, the failure to pursue the issues beyond 
ministerial consultations may result in issues of compliance not being fully 
resolved in a satisfactory manner. The activities in subsequent ministerial 
agreements to ensure compliance merely include workshops and international 
conferences; similar to those activities mandated under certain cooperative 
activities provisions of other trade agreements concluded by the United States. 
This failure to utilise the procedures for ensuring implementation is also evident 
in relation to other trade agreements. With regards to agreements concluded by 
the EU, no formal reviews have been carried out by the EU Commission. 
Additionally, monitoring of compliance with labour rights as mandated by 
certain agreements has placed little priority on the contained “social clauses”. 
This lack of priority is also reinforced by the failure to react to the DAG’s 
submission on labour rights compliance by Korea, despite previous assertions 
that these would be treated with seriousness and respect.  
 
This picture could be contrasted with the situation in relation to GSPs that 
include “social clauses”. Two out of the eleven schemes currently in operation, 
those established by the U.S. and the EU, include such clauses. Withdrawal of 
preferences as a result of failure to comply with labour rights obligations as 
occurred a number of times under both schemes. The U.S. system, as part of their 
annual review of beneficiaries, has withdrawn preferences fifteen times. 
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Currently, despite the expiration of the GSP, there are six ongoing investigations 
that may lead to further withdrawals. However, the U.S. process can be a 
protracted affair. For example, from the original submission to final removal of 
preferences, the proceedings relating to Bangladesh took six years to conclude. 
 
The EU GSP+ scheme, in contrast with the U.S. and other EU schemes, provides 
additional trade incentives for countries that ratify and fully implement core 
labour conventions. This scheme creates a strong link between trade and labour 
rights and imposes a number of additional obligations, including monitoring 
obligations, upon beneficiaries. However, trade incentives under all three 
branches of the EU GSP programme can be withdrawn in the event that 
beneficiaries carry out serious and systemic violations of the principles 
contained within fundamental labour conventions. Generally, when reviewing 
the beneficiary status of States within the EU system with regards to compliance 
with these labour conventions, a heavy reliance is placed upon the reports of the 
ILO in order to ensure that preferences are only afforded to compliant countries. 
This has resulted in removal of preferences for Belarus and Myanmar under the 
GSP scheme, despite the latter having preferences reinstated once compliance 
was achieved. The reliance on ILO reports and proceedings may have also 
resulted in the EU proceedings being a more expedient process compared with 
that of the United States. For example, the removal of preferences in respect of 
Myanmar took less than two years from the original submissions to the final 
decision of the European Council.  
 
Generally, there appears reluctance to fully utilise the procedures available 
within the abovementioned agreements to implement “social clauses”. The 
recent unprecedented decision of the U.S. to pursue arbitration with regards to 
the non-compliance of Guatemala could be a change in the tide. However, it 
remains to be seen whether the review mechanisms in other agreements will 
also be utilised in a similar manner in the future. Further implementation of 
these “social clauses” is a necessary step in order to move towards the high 
aspirations relating to the protection of labour rights from the potentially 
adverse effects of liberalised trade and globalisation.  
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Annex 1 – Free Trade Agreements including “social clauses” 
 
Party Core Agreement Side-Agreement Cooperation 
Australia South Korea 
(12/12/2014),  
U.S. (01/01/2005) 
  Chile (06/03/2009) 
Bahrain U.S. (01/08/2006)     
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
EFTA (01/01/2015)     
Canada South Korea 
(01/01/2015) 
Chile (05/07/1997),  
Colombia (15/08/2011), 
Costa Rica 
(01/11/2002), Honduras 
(01/10/2014), Jordan 
(01/10/2012),  
NAALC (01/01/1994), 
Panama (01/04/2013),  
Peru (01/08/2009) 
  
CARIFORUM* EU (01/11/2008)     
Central 
America* 
EU (01/08/2013),  
U.S. and Dominican 
Republic (01/03/2006) 
    
Chile Colombia 
(08/05/2009),  
EU (01/02/2003),  
Turkey (01/03/2011),  
U.S. (01/01/2004) 
Canada (05/07/1997),  
China (01/08/2010),  
Panama (07/03/2008),  
Peru (01/03/2009) 
Australia (06/03/2009) 
China   Chile (01/08/2010) New Zealand 
(01/10/2008) 
Chinese 
Taipei 
New Zealand 
(01/12/2013), 
Nicaragua 
(01/01/2008) 
    
Colombia Chile (08/05/2009),  
EU (with Peru, 
01/03/2013),  
U.S. (18/05/2012) 
Canada (15/08/2011)   
Costa Rica EFTA (with Panama, 
19/08/2014) 
Canada (01/11/2002) Singapore (01/07/2013) 
Dominican 
Republic 
Central America and 
U.S. (01/03/2006) 
    
EFTA* Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
(01/01/2015),  
Costa Rica/Panama 
(19/08/2014),  
Hong Kong 
(01/10/2012) 
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Party Core Agreement Side-Agreement Cooperation 
EU CARIFORUM 
(01/11/2008),  
Central America 
(01/08/2013), 
Colombia/Peru 
(01/03/2013),  
Georgia (01/09/2014), 
South Korea 
(01/01/2011),  
OCT (01/01/1971),  
Moldova (01/09/2014) 
 
  Chile (01/02/2013),  
South Africa (01/01/2000) 
Georgia EU (01/09/2014)     
Honduras   Canada (01/10/2014)   
Hong Kong EFTA (01/10/2012) New Zealand 
(01/01/2011) 
  
Japan Philippines 
(11/12/2008), 
Switzerland 
(01/09/2009) 
    
Jordan U.S. (17/12/2001) Canada (01/10/2012)   
Malaysia   New Zealand 
(01/08/2010) 
  
Mexico  NAALC (01/01/1994)    
Moldova EU (01/09/2014)   
Montenegro EFTA (01/09/2012)     
Morocco U.S. (01/01/2006)     
New Zealand Chinese Taipei 
(01/12/2013) 
Malaysia (01/08/2010),  
Hong Kong 
(01/01/2011), 
Thailand (01/07/2005) 
China (01/10/2008) 
Nicaragua Chinese Taipei 
(01/01/2008) 
    
OCT* EU (01/01/1971)     
Oman U.S. (01/01/2009)     
Panama U.S. (31/10/2012) Canada (01/04/2013),  
Chile (07/03/2008) 
  
Peru EU (with Colombia, 
01/03/2013),  
South Korea 
(01/08/2011),  
U.S. (01/02/2009) 
Canada (01/08/2009),  
Chile (01/03/2009) 
  
Philippines Japan (11/12/2008)     
Singapore U.S. (01/01/2004)   Costa Rica (01/07/2013) 
South Africa EU (01/01/2000)     
South Korea Australia 
(12/12/2014),  
Canada (01/01/2015),  
EU (01/07/2011),  
Peru (01/08/2011),  
Turkey (01/05/2013),  
U.S. (15/03/2012) 
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Party Core Agreement Side-Agreement Cooperation 
Switzerland Japan (01/09/2009) China (01/07/2014)   
Thailand   New Zealand 
(01/07/2005) 
 
Turkey Chile (01/03/2011), 
South Korea 
(01/05/2013) 
    
U.S. Australia 
(01/01/2005),  
Bahrain (01/08/2006),  
Chile (01/01/2004), 
Colombia 
(18/05/2012), 
Dominican Republic 
and Central America 
(01/03/2006),  
Jordan (17/12/2001), 
Morocco 
(01/01/2006),  
Oman (01/01/2009), 
Panama (31/10/2012),  
Peru (01/02/2009), 
Singapore 
(01/01/2004),  
South Korea 
(15/03/2012) 
 NAALC (01/01/1994)   
 
Key 
 
*CARIFORUM Antigua and Bermuda; Bahamas; Barbados; 
Belize; Dominica; Dominican Republic; 
Grenada; Guyana; Jamaica; Saint Kitts and 
Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
*Central America Costa Rica; El Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; 
Nicaragua; Panama. 
 
*EFTA      Iceland; Liechtenstein; Norway; Switzerland. 
 
*OCT Anguilla; Aruba; British Indian Ocean 
Territory; Cayman Islands; Falkland Islands 
(Islas Malvinas); French Polynesia; French 
Southern Territories; Greenland; Mayotte; 
Montserrat; Netherlands Antilles; New 
Caledonia; Pitcairn; Saint Helena; Saint Pierre 
and Miquelon; South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands; Turks and Caicos Islands; 
Virgin Islands, British; Wallis and Futuna 
Islands. 
 
Dates refer to the date on which the agreement came into force. 
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Annex 2 – Regional Free Trade Regimes including “social 
clauses” 
 
Agreement State Parties 
CARICOM 
(Caribbean Community) –  
Declaration of Labour and Industrial 
Relations Principles (1995) 
Antigua and Barbuda; Bahamas; Barbados; Belize; 
Dominica; Grenada; Guyana; Haiti; Jamaica; Montserrat; 
Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago 
ECOWAS 
(Economic Community of West African 
States)(1993) 
Benin; Burkina Faso; Cape Verde; Côte d'Ivoire; Ghana; 
Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Liberia, Republic of; Mali; Niger; 
Nigeria; Senegal; Sierra Leone; The Gambia; Togo 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(2006) 
Brunei Darussalam; Chile; New Zealand; Singapore 
COMESA  
(Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa)(1994) 
Angola; Burundi; Comoros; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Kenya; 
Lesotho; Malawi; Mauritius; Rwanda; Sudan; Swaziland; 
Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe 
EAC (East African Community)(2000) Burundi; Kenya; Rwanda; Tanzania; Uganda 
Cartagena Agreement on the Andean 
Community –  
Andean Instrument on Occupational 
Safety and Health (1994) 
Bolivia; Colombia; Ecuador; Peru; Venezuela 
MERCOSUR (Southern Common 
Market) –  
Social-Labour Declaration (1998) 
Argentina; Brazil; Paraguay; Uruguay 
 
  
111 
 
Annex 3 – Overview of NAALC Submissions 
  
Key 
 
R  - Report Issued 
R+A  - Report Issued and Ministerial Agreement signed 
N/A  - No information on submission available 
Group 1  - Freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike. 
Group 2  - Discrimination, migrant workers’ rights, and payment of overtime. 
Group 3  - Occupational safety and health, child labour, and payment of the  
   minimum wage 
Submission Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Status Against 
U.S. 2005-03 ✓ ✓ ✓ R Mexico 
U.S. 2003-01 ✓ ✓ ✓ R+A Mexico 
U.S. 2000-01   ✓ R+A Mexico 
U.S. 9901 ✓ ✓ ✓ R+A Mexico 
U.S. 9703 ✓  ✓ R+A Mexico 
U.S. 9702 ✓  ✓ R+A Mexico 
U.S. 9701  ✓  R+A Mexico 
U.S. 9601 ✓   R+A Mexico 
U.S. 940003 ✓   R+A Mexico 
U.S. 940001/2 ✓   R Mexico 
CAN 2003-1 ✓ ✓ ✓ R+A Mexico 
CAN 98-1 ✓  ✓ R Mexico 
MEX 2011-1  ✓ ✓ R U.S. 
MEX 2006-1 ✓ ✓ ✓ R U.S. 
MEX 2005-1  ✓ ✓ R U.S. 
MEX 2003-1 ✓ ✓ ✓ R U.S. 
MEX 2001-1  ✓ ✓ R U.S. 
MEX 9801 ✓   R+A U.S. 
MEX 9802 ✓ ✓ ✓ R+A U.S. 
MEX 9803  ✓ ✓ R+A U.S. 
MEX 9804  ✓  R+A U.S. 
MEX 9501 ✓   R+A U.S. 
U.S. 2011-02 ✓   Under Review Mexico 
CAN 2011-1 N/A N/A N/A Under Review Mexico 
CAN 2008-1 ✓ ✓ ✓ Under Review U.S. 
U.S. 2006-01 ✓  ✓ Declined Mexico 
U.S. 2005-02 ✓   Declined Mexico 
U.S. 2005-01 ✓   Declined Mexico 
U.S. 2001-01 ✓   Declined Mexico 
U.S. 9804 ✓   Declined Canada 
U.S. 9802   ✓ Declined Mexico 
U.S. 9801 ✓   Declined Mexico 
CAN 2005-1 ✓   Declined Mexico 
CAN 99-1 N/A N/A N/A Declined U.S. 
U.S. 2004-01   ✓ Withdrawn Mexico 
U.S. 9803 ✓   Withdrawn Canada 
U.S. 9602 ✓   Withdrawn Mexico 
U.S. 940004 ✓   Withdrawn Mexico 
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